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Prosecuting Aggression
Noah Weisbord*
The Assembly of States Parties to the International Criminal Court will soon have its first opportunity to
revise the Rome Statute and activate the latent crime of aggression, which awaits a definition of its
elements and conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction. The working group charged with drafting a
provision is scheduled to complete its task by 2008 or 2009, one year before the International Criminal
Court’s first review conference. Beginning with a history of the crime meant to put the current negotiations
in the context of past initiatives, this article sets out the status of the negotiations and begins to forecast
prosecutorial challenges created by alternative formulations. It concludes by identifying the main
prosecutorial challenges common to all formulations to see how a case against a political or military leader
for the crime of aggression will look.

INTRODUCTION
The Assembly of States Parties (“ASP” or “Assembly”) to the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “Court”) will soon have its first opportunity to revise the Rome Statute and activate the latent crime of aggression,
which awaits a definition. The ASP has empowered a special working group
to produce a draft definition by the end of 2008, so as to give states time to
consider and discuss the proposal at home and abroad before the Court’s
2009 or 2010 review conference. The Special Working Group on the Crime
of Aggression (“SWGCA” or “Working Group”) has been meeting periodically in Princeton, New York City, and The Hague, and has made significant progress on the definition and the jurisdictional preconditions of the
crime. However, there is no common framework from which to evaluate
competing proposals, and interests have been playing as important a role as
ideals in shaping the outcome.
One under-explored question in the definitional debate is what challenges
the various formulations will create for the Prosecutor of the ICC as he or
she prepares a case against an individual for the crime of aggression. Beginning with a history of the crime meant to put the current negotiations in the
context of past initiatives, this article sets out, in detail, the status of the
negotiations and begins to forecast prosecutorial challenges. Identifying future challenges is one way to evaluate competing proposals, foresee what an
* B.Sc., B.S.W., LL.B., B.C.L., M.S.W., McGill University; LL.M., S.J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law
School. The author is a delegate for the Coalition for the International Criminal Court at the meetings of
the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression and a former law clerk to ICC Prosecutor Luis
Moreno-Ocampo. He would like to thank Martha Minow, Benjamin Ferencz, Roger Clark, Donald Ferencz, Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel, and Jennifer Trahan for their comments on successive drafts, and the
members of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression for their valuable insights and ideas.
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aggression case would look like, and begin to answer the question that underlies all others: is criminalizing aggression at this time and in this way a
worthwhile endeavor?
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

OF THE

CRIME

OF

AGGRESSION

As the 1998 Rome Conference on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court came to a close and the plenipotentiaries remained deadlocked over the crime of aggression, members of the Non-Aligned Movement proposed a temporary compromise.1 Aggression would be included in
article 5 of the Rome Statute establishing the ICC as a crime falling within
the purview of the Court, but the definition and the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction would be omitted, pending agreement at a future review
conference to occur no earlier than seven years after the Statute came into
force.2 On July 17, 1998, 120 states voted in favor of the treaty, 7 voted
against it, and 21 abstained, and the Statute was adopted. The crime of
aggression became the ICC’s latent crime.
The Rome Conference was not the first attempt to criminalize aggressive
war. The crime of aggression repeatedly captured the twentieth-century legal imagination.3 Some initiatives were fruitful, others less so. In 1919, at
the end of World War I, plans were made under article 227 of the Versailles
Treaty of Peace to hold German Kaiser Wilhelm II criminally responsible
for “a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of
treaties.”4 In his memoirs, English Prime Minister David Lloyd George recollects that during the interwar period there was “a growing feeling that
war itself was a crime against humanity, and that it would never be finally
eliminated until it was brought into the same category as all other crimes by
the infliction of condign punishment on the perpetrators and instigators.”5
The Kaiser ultimately took shelter in the Netherlands, which refused to
extradite him to an international tribunal applying ex post facto law.6
1. Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court, in THE INTERNACRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 79, 85 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999); see also
Silvia A. Fernández de Gurmendi, Completing the Work of the Preparatory Commission: The Working Group on
Aggression at the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 589,
589 (2002).
2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 5(2), 121, 123, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
3. For a compilation of key documents, see Benjamin B. Ferencz, Defining International Aggression:
The Search for World Peace (1975).
4. See Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associate Powers and Germany art. 227, June 28, 1919,
225 Consol. T.S. 188; see also Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of the War and on
Enforcement of Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference (1919), reprinted in 14 AM. J.
INT’L L. 95, 116–17 (1920); James Brown Scott, The Trial of the Kaiser, in WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT
PARIS 231, 243–44 (Edward M. House & Charles Seymore eds., 1921).
5. DAVID LLOYD GEORGE, MEMOIRS OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 55 (1939).
6. Benjamin B. Ferencz, From Nuremberg to Rome: A Personal Account, in JUSTICE FOR CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY 31, 31 (Mark Lattimer & Philippe Sands eds., 2003).
TIONAL
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The League of Nations prohibited recourse to war to resolve international
disputes.7 In 1923, it sponsored the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance that
stated, “aggressive war [i]s an international crime.”8 Likewise, the 1924
League of Nations Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (“1924 Geneva Protocol”) declared in its preamble, “a war of aggression constitutes . . . an international crime.”9 Outside the League of Nations
framework, the 1928 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War (the Kellogg-Briand Pact), concluded among the heads of the United States the German Reich, and the French Republic, as well as other world leaders,
provided for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy and
included a pledge to resolve all disputes by pacific means.10 However, while
these instruments made clear the increasingly accepted view of aggressive
war as an international crime, their success was limited. For example, the
1924 Geneva Protocol was signed by the leading statesmen of the interwar
period but was never ratified. In 1946, looking back at the negotiations
culminating in the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Nuremberg Tribunal recalled, “[t]he principal objection appeared to be in the difficulty of
defining the acts which would constitute ‘aggression’, rather than any doubt
as to the criminality of aggressive war.”11
Moreover, the language of these interwar assurances was ambiguous as to
the type of responsibility international aggression would attract and the entity to which responsibility would attach. Many, if not most, contemporary
international law scholars challenge the interwar characterization of aggressive war as a crime attracting stigma and punishment rather than a delict
giving rise to a tort claim for compensation. There was also uncertainty over
whether aggression would involve individual responsibility, state responsibility, or both. No international prosecutor was ever appointed during this
period or, it seems, even envisaged. Nevertheless, these interwar assurances
later served as an important basis for the Nuremberg determination that the
crime of aggression was customary international law prior to 1939.
In the wake of World War II, nations flagrantly violated the interwar
prohibitions on international aggression with impunity, and the League collapsed under its own irrelevance. By 1943, when fighting raged all over
Europe and the outcome of the contest was uncertain, the Allies began advocating for the trial of Axis leaders upon Axis defeat and established the U.N.
War Crimes Commission to begin preparatory investigative work.12 Accord7. Covenant of the League of Nations.
8. Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, 3 J. BRIT. INST. INT’L AFF. 45, 51 (1924).
9. Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 19 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 9
(1925).
10. General Treaty for the Renunciation of War arts. 1, 2, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S.
57.
11. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT’L. L. 172, 219
(1947) [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment].
12. William A. Schabas, Origins of the Criminalization of Aggression: How Crimes Against Peace Became the
“Supreme International Crime,” in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION

\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-1\HLI104.txt

164

unknown

Seq: 4

26-DEC-07

13:16

Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 49

ing to the official U.N. history, “[b]y far the most important issue of substantive law to be studied by the [U.N. War Crimes] Commission and its
Legal Committee was the question of whether aggressive war amounts to a
criminal act.”13
After the Allied victory in World War II and a rigorous debate over the
merits of the crime, international aggression was included as a Crime
Against Peace under article 6(a) in the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal.14 The provision empowered prosecutors at Nuremberg to investigate and prosecute Nazi “leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices”
for the “planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression,
or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any
of the foregoing.”15 Count one of the indictment addressed the common
plan or conspiracy to commit crimes against peace and count two contained
the charges relating to crimes against peace.16 The prosecution indicted
twenty-four German defendants for one or both counts.17 The bench found
twelve defendants guilty of at least one count.18 The prosecution’s primary
challenge was not to capture suspects (unconditional German surrender gave
the Allies free rein to arrest), select cases (the leading Nazi perpetrators were
notorious), or acquire evidence linking the defendants to state/collective acts
of aggression (the Nazis kept meticulous records), but to establish the legitimacy of the crime itself.19 The tribunal ultimately rejected defense claims of
retroactivity and, on the basis of interwar treaties, found that the crime of
17, 22 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppi Nesi eds., 2002); see also Roger S. Clark, Nuremberg and the Crime Against
Peace, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
13. UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 180 (1948), quoted in Schabas, supra note 12,
at 22. See generally Sheldon Glueck, The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War, 59 HARV. L. REV. 396
(1945–1946) (discussing the legitimacy of the crime of aggression).
14. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annexed to London Agreement for the Establishment of an International Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Charter]. For details of the debate over the merits of the crime, see generally GARY
JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 147–205
(2000); TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1992);
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS, LONDON, 1945 (1949) [hereinafter JACKSON]; Glueck,
supra note 13.
15. London Charter, supra note 14, art. 6.
16. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 11, at 186.
17. These defendants were Hermann Wilhelm Göring, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Robert
Ley, Wilhelm Keitel, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Alfred Rosenberg, Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Julius
Streicher, Walter Funk, Hjalmar Schacht, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Karl Dönitz, Erich
Raeder, Baldur von Schirach, Fritz Sauckel, Alfred Jodl, Martin Bormann, Franz von Papen, Artur SeyssInquart, Albert Speer, Constantin von Neurath, and Hans Fritzsche. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 11, at
272–331. Robert Ley committed suicide in prison, and Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach was not
tried because of his deteriorating physical and mental condition. Id. at 173.
18. Göring, Hess, von Ribbentrop, Hess, Keitel, Rosenberg, Raeder, Jodl, von Neurath, Frick, Funk,
Dönitz, and Seyss-Inquart. Id. at 272–331.
19. See JACKSON, supra note 14; Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 11, at 186.
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aggression—“the supreme international crime”—was customary international law prior to 1939.20
Immediately following the judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, prosecutors built four cases charging crimes against peace
in occupied Germany: the I.G. Farben case,21 the Krupp case,22 the High Command case,23 and the Ministries case.24 Within its zone of occupation, France
prosecuted the Roechling case.25 These successor trials adhered closely to the
jurisprudence of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg on
crimes against peace and built upon it.26 With the legitimacy of the crime
established by the Allied prosecutors at Nuremberg, the Cold War on the
horizon, and German allegiance gaining strategic importance, the prosecutors’ foremost challenge was independently and impartially prosecuting the
Nazis according to the rule of law without unduly provoking a backlash in
Germany.
In 1948, prosecutors at the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East in Tokyo indicted twenty-eight high-level defendants for crimes
against peace and related conspiracy charges.27 The crimes against peace indictment was divided into five subject areas: counts one through five addressed the common plan or conspiracy; counts six through seventeen, the
planning and preparation of wars of aggression; counts eighteen through
twenty-six, the initiation of wars of aggression; counts twenty-seven
through thirty-six, the waging of wars of aggression; and counts thirty-seven
through fifty-two, individual responsibility for conspiracy to commit mur-

20. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 11, at 186.
21. Charges were brought against 24 high-level officials of industry. The tribunal found that “[t]he
evidence falls far short of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that their endeavours and activities [the
rearmament of Germany] were undertaken and carried out with the knowledge that they were thereby
preparing Germany for participation in an aggressive war.” 8 U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFF., TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO.
10, at 1081, 1123 (1952) [hereinafter NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS]; see also JOSEPH BORKIN, THE
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT OF IG FARBEN (1978).
22. Twelve high-level managers and officials in the Krupp firm were tried. The tribunal dismissed
charges for lack of sufficient evidence. NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 21, at 1.
23. Fourteen officers holding high-level positions in the German military were charged with crimes
against peace and conspiracy to commit crimes against peace. All of the accused were acquitted on the
basis that they were “not at the policy level.” Id. at 462, 491.
24. Twenty-one high-level officials in the government or Nazi Party were charged with crimes against
peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Seventeen were charged with aggression and/or conspiracy to commit aggression. Id. at 308, 314, 323, 435.
25. The directors of the Roechling firm were charged with crimes against peace, namely encouraging
and contributing to the preparation of aggressive war. The charges were dropped against all but
Roechling, who was convicted. The Supreme Government Court of the French Occupation Zone in
Germany reversed the conviction for crimes against peace because they “remained outside the boundary
‘which has been fixed very high by the IMT.’ ” Id. at 1109–10.
26. See Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Crim. Ct., Working Group on the Crime of Aggression,
Historical Review of Developments Relating to Aggression, at 44–45, PCNICC/2002/WGCA/L.1 (Apr. 8-19,
2002).
27. In re Hirota and Others, 15 ANN. DIG. 356, 362–63 (Int’l Mil. Trib. for the Far East, 1948).
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der and actual unlawful killing or murder as crimes against peace.28 The
Tokyo Tribunal rejected the defendants’ challenge that aggressive war is a
state act that does not attract individual criminal responsibility under international law and, carefully distinguishing between the five subject areas in
the indictment, the tribunal found most of the defendants guilty.29 The
judgment stands out in the history of the crime of aggression for the detail
of its jurisprudence. However, over time, allegations of prosecutorial bias
and political interference at the stage of case selection have undermined the
authority of the Tokyo trial. According to MIT-based historian John Dower:
[E]ven Japanese activists who endorse the ideals of the Nuremberg and
Tokyo charters, and who have labored to document and publicize Japanese atrocities, cannot defend . . . the American decision to exonerate
the emperor of war responsibility and then, in the chill of the Cold
war, release and soon afterwards openly embrace accused right-winged
war criminals like the later prime minister Nobusuke Kishi.30
The Allied victors of WWII met in 1944 in Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, to build a new international system centered around an enforceable prohibition on international aggression. The new U.N. system was designed to
be more effective than the League of Nations by reflecting the political realities of the age and giving the world’s five dominant nations—the Republic
of China, the French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United Kingdom, and the United States—special powers and responsibilities relating to the prevention and suppression of acts of international aggression. Along with their enforcement responsibilities, the “Big Five” were
granted permanent seats on the Security Council and a veto allowing them
to block any Security Council action detrimental to their own interests.
Beginning soon after the creation of the U.N. system, and continuing for
nearly twenty years, three successive U.N. General Assembly Special Committees on the Question of Defining Aggression attempted to define the
crime: none succeeded.31 The Soviet Union, with an eye toward its vulnera28. U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFF., TRIAL OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS: DOCUMENTS 45 (1946) [hereinafter TRIAL OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS: DOCUMENTS]. For the grouping of the counts into five subject
areas, see Historical Review of Developments Relating to Aggression, supra note 26, at 87.
29. TRIAL OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS: DOCUMENTS, supra note 28, at 23–24.
30. John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II 562 (1999).
31. Benjamin B. Ferencz, The United Nations Consensus Definition of Aggression: Sieve or Substance?, 10 J.
INT’L L. & ECON. 701, 707 (1975) [hereinafter Ferencz (1975)]. See generally U.N. Gen. Assembly, Special Comm. on the Question of Defining Aggression, Sixth Comm., Report of the Special Committee on the
Question of Defining Aggression, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (1974); U.N. Gen. Assembly, Special Comm. on the
Question of Defining Aggression, Sixth Comm., Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining
Aggression, U.N. Doc. A/9019 (1973); U.N. Gen. Assembly, Special Comm. on the Question of Defining
Aggression, Sixth Comm., Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, U.N. Doc.
8719 (1972); U.N. Gen. Assembly, Special Comm. on the Question of Defining Aggression, Sixth
Comm., Report of Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, U.N. Doc. A/8419 (1971); U.N.
Gen. Assembly, Special Comm. on the Question of Defining Aggression, Sixth Comm., Report of the
Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, U.N. Doc. A/8019 (1970); U.N. Gen. Assembly,
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ble satellite territories, pressed for a wide definition of aggression that included a provision denying recognition of sovereignty over forcefully
occupied territories.32 The United States, which regularly invoked an “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense” to justify its Cold War
interventions, championed the Six-Power Draft, which would have emphasized this right and focused attention on the intention of the intervening
state.33 According to Umberto Leanza, head of the Legal Services of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy, “[e]ach draft reflected the particular visions
and interests of the drafters.”34 Looking back at this period, Chief Prosecutor in the Einsatzgruppen Trial at Nuremberg Benjamin Ferencz quipped,
“[w]ith fighting going on all over the globe—including in India, Pakistan,
Cyprus, the Congo, Cambodia, Vietnam and the Middle East—it was clear
that it was easier to commit aggression than to define it.”35 The Cold War
produced its own logic of intervention, which froze multilateral efforts to
define the crime, let alone empower an independent prosecutor to investigate and prosecute violations.36
Frustrated by the deadlock in the Security Council, the U.N. General
Assembly adopted the Uniting for Peace Resolution in 1950.37 The Uniting
for Peace Resolution, which was championed by the United States to thwart
an expected Soviet veto of a Security Council resolution calling for collective
action against North Korea, established a procedure whereby the General
Assembly was required to immediately address threats to the peace to which
the Security Council had failed to respond due to the exercise of veto power.
Under the Uniting for Peace procedure, the General Assembly found that
“China, by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression in Korea . . . has itself engaged in aggression in Korea,”
but authorized economic sanctions rather than the use of armed force.38 Subsequently, the General Assembly used the resolution to legitimize determi-

Special Comm. on the Question of Aggression, Sixth Comm., Report of the Special Committee on the Question
of Defining Aggression, U.N. Doc. A/7620 (1969); U.N. General Assembly, Sixth Comm., Report of the
Special Comm. on the Question of Defining Aggression, U.N. Doc. A/7402 (1968); G.A. Res. 2330
(XXII), U.N. Doc. A/6988 (Dec. 18, 1967) (thirty-five members); G.A. Res. 895 (IX), U.N. Doc. A/
2890 (Dec. 4, 1954) (nineteen members); G.A. Res. 378/B (V), U.N. Doc. A/529 (Nov. 17, 1950)
(fifteen members).
32. Umberto Leanza, The Historical Background, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE
CRIME OF AGGRESSION 3, 6 (Mauro Politi and Guiseppe Nesi eds., 2004).
33. Id.; Benjamin Ferencz, Defining Aggression: Where It Stands and Where It’s Going, 66 AM. J. INT’L L.
491, 495 (1972) [hereinafter Ferencz (1972)]. The Six Powers were Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.
34. Leanza, supra note 32, at 6.
35. Ferencz (1975), supra note 31, at 708.
36. Id.
37. Uniting for Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 337(V), U.N. Doc. A/RES/377 (Nov. 3, 1951).
38. Intervention of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China in Korea, G.A.
Res. 498 (V), U.N. Doc. A/RES/498 (Nov. 5, 1951).
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nations of acts of aggression and/or calls for collective action on a few
occasions, most decisively in the 1956 Suez Crisis.39
In 1974, a fourth U.N. Special Committee on the Question of Defining
Aggression40 finally managed to produce a draft definition of aggression,
which the General Assembly adopted unanimously without a vote.41 The
core of the 1974 G.A. resolution is an introductory paragraph that contains
a generic definition and a non-exhaustive, illustrative list of seven acts of
aggression.42 Under this definition, the first use of armed force by a state in
contravention of the Charter of the United Nations is prima facie evidence of
an act of aggression, although the Security Council may conclude otherwise.43 Another provision safeguards the right of peoples dominated by colonial, racist or alien regimes to struggle for self-determination.44
The 1974 definition marked a watershed moment that Ferencz attributes,
in large part, to a “new spirit of détente” between the United States and the
Soviet Union and the effective personalities of the U.S. and Soviet representatives, Robert Rosenstock and D.N. Kolesnick.45 However, some delegations, eager to downplay the significance of the consensus, insisted that the
definition was designed as guidance to the U.N. Security Council, not as a
basis for prosecution.46 Looking back today, Ferencz relives his frustration
that “[n]o one seemed to recall that the GA had mandated a code and court
to serve as the basis for enforcing the Nuremberg principles.”47 Others debated whether the definition was a suitable basis for criminalizing aggression48—a debate that continues to this day in the Special Working Group
on the Crime of Aggression. In the end, the consensus definition was regularly cited throughout the Cold War, but never as a basis for prosecution in
a criminal trial49 and never by the Security Council.

39. G.A. Res. 999, U.N. GAOR, 1st Emergency Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/3354 (Nov.
4, 1956); G.A. Res. 998, U.N. GAOR, 1st Emergency Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/3354
(Nov. 4, 1956); G.A. Res. 997, U.N. GAOR, 1st Emergency Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/
3354 (Nov. 2, 1956).
40. A larger committee, established in 1967 with 35 participants. See G.A. Res. 2330 (XXII), U.N.
Doc. A/RES/2330 (Dec. 18, 1967).
41. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974).
42. Id. arts. 1, 3.
43. Id. art. 2.
44. Id. art. 7.
45. Ferencz (1975), supra note 31, at 708.
46. Ferencz (1972), supra note 33, at 493
47. E-mail from Benjamin Ferencz to author (Apr. 4, 2007) (on file with author).
48. In 1996, the International Law Commission decided that the 1974 definition was not a suitable
basis for criminalizing aggression, see infra note 56 and accompanying text, while Professor M. Cherif
Bassiouni, writing at around the same time, took the opposite view. M. Cherif Bassiouni & Benjamin B.
Ferencz, The Crime Against Peace, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 313, 316 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.,
2d ed. 1999).
49. See Nicolaos Strapatsas, Rethinking General Assembly Resolution 3314 (1974) as a Basis for the Definition of Aggression Under the Rome Statute of the ICC, in RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE
SUBSTANTIVE PART 155 (Olaoluwa Lousanya ed., 2007).
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Not only was the Security Council ineffective at preventing international
aggression during the Cold War and its aftermath, but it has even been
reticent to name it. According to Nicolaos Strapatsas, an expert delegate on
the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, the Security Council, from its inception, has made express resolutions condemning aggression
only thirty-one times: nineteen condemning South Africa for aggression
against several African States (between 1976 and 1987); six condemning the
minority regime of Southern Rhodesia for aggression against various African
States (between 1973 and 1979); two condemning acts of aggression perpetrated against Seychelles (in 1981 and 1982); two condemning Israel for
aggression against Tunisia (in 1985 and 1988); one condemning aggression
against Benin (in 1977); and one condemning Iraq for aggression against
diplomatic premises in Kuwait (in 1990).50 However, since the Security
Council was established in 1945, there have been many prima facie acts of
aggression—the Korean War, the Falklands War, the Iran-Iraq War, and
operations by and against Israel, to name just a few—that the Security
Council labeled euphemistically or, due to its internal political dynamics,
failed to name at all.
During the 1990s, scholars and activists, such as A.M. Warner, called for
the prosecution of Saddam Hussein for the crime of aggression against Kuwait.51 In 1990, U.S. President George Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher discussed holding the Iraqi leader accountable for the
invasion.52 According to Professor William Schabas, “[t]he idea later gained
some purchase within the [European Union] before fading.”53 It was clear
that despite the contentiousness of the concept of aggression and the irrelevance of the 1974 definition in the chambers of the Security Council, the
crime of aggression had captured the twentieth-century legal imagination.
Ultimately, however, the victorious U.S.-led coalition chose sanctions for
the Republic of Iraq after the first Gulf War rather than deposing and prosecuting Saddam Hussein.
There was also no prosecution for the crime of aggression in the aftermath
of the Yugoslav and Rwandan atrocities. Though the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg, which prioritized aggression, was the inspiration
for the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the statutes
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda were silent on the supreme in-

50. See id.
51. Andrew M. Warner, The Case Against Saddam Hussein—The Case for World Order, 43 MERCER
L. REV. 563 (1992).
52. William Schabas, Issue #15: Should Saddam Hussein Be Prosecuted for the Crime of Aggression?, Grotian
Moment: The International War Crimes Trial Blog, Iraqi High Tribunals Trials, Case W. Res. U. Sch. L.
(Oct. 19, 2005), http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/entry.asp?entry_id=21 (last visited Oct. 11,
2007).
53. Id.
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ternational crime.54 These tribunals, post hoc judicial responses to predominantly intra-national rather than international violence, focused instead on
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes and were an acknowledgement by the Security Council of its poor track record at fulfilling its
essential function: to prevent aggression and mass violence.
In 1996, the International Law Commission (“ILC”), which had been
charged by the General Assembly in 1947 with formulating the principles
of international law recognized in the Charter and judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal,55 rejected the General Assembly’s 1974 definition of aggression, arguing that it was overly political and lacked legal precision.56
Commentary to the ILC’s Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace identifies
the Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Charter of the United
Nations, but not the 1974 definition, as “the main sources of authority with
regard to individual criminal responsibility for acts of aggression.”57 In
place of the 1974 definition, the ILC offers article 16, which states that
“[a]n individual who, as leader or organizer, actively participates in or orders the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of aggression committed by a State shall be responsible for a crime of aggression.”58 Despite fifty
years of deliberation, the ILC definition had barely evolved except to include
a reference to the U.N. Charter, and thus left many issues unresolved.59
According to Professors Bassiouni and Ferencz, “a comparative analysis of
the ILC’s . . . effort to define aggression demonstrates the inconclusiveness of
this undertaking.”60
The crime of aggression was among the most divisive issues on the agenda
at the 1998 Rome Conference establishing the International Criminal Court
(“ICC”).61 Many developing countries, particularly the non-aligned members and members of the Arab group, as well as some major industrialized
powers, including Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Greece, urged the
inclusion of a definition of aggression in the Statute, while the United States
and a number of its Western allies opposed it.62 The European Union and
approximately thirty non-aligned states would not endorse an ICC without
the supreme international crime, while others, including the United States
54. See Statute of the International Tribunal, 32 I.L.M. 1192, available at http://www.un.org/icty/
basic/statut/statute.htm, adopted by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 1203 [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International Tribunal for
Rwanda, 33 I.L.M. 1602, available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html, adopted by
S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1600
[hereinafter ICTR Statute]; WAR CRIMES: THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG (Belinda Cooper ed., 1999).
55. G.A. Res. 177(II), U.N. Doc. A/519 (Nov. 21, 1947).
56. See Int’l. L. Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 48th Session, May
6–July 26, 1996, at 83–85, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (SUPP) (Jan. 1, 1996) [hereinafter ILC Work Report].
57. Id. at 85.
58. Id. at 83.
59. See id.
60. Bassiouni & Ferencz, supra note 48, at 342.
61. Von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 1, at 79, 81, 84.
62. Bassiouni & Ferencz, supra note 48, at 346.
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and the United Kingdom, were adamantly opposed to the inclusion of the
crime in the competence of the Court. In the closing hours of the conference,
the chairman, veteran Canadian diplomat Philippe Kirsch, brokered a compromise whereby the crime of aggression was included as article 5(1)(d) of
the Rome Statute, but the definition and the conditions for the exercise of
jurisdiction were omitted pending agreement at a future review conference.63 The plenipotentiaries deferred to a preparatory commission
(“PrepCom”), which had been created by the U.N. General Assembly in
1995, to devise a draft definition.64
Even in the absence of an ICC definition, the crime of aggression has
influenced the course of domestic and international politics relating to the
use of force. In the run-up to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003,
the attorney general of the United Kingdom, Lord Goldsmith, sent a note to
Prime Minister Tony Blair warning that, though the possibility of prosecution is remote, “aggression is a crime under customary international law
which automatically forms part of domestic law. It might therefore be argued that international aggression is a crime recognized by the common law
which can be prosecuted in the U.K. courts.”65 On the eve of the invasion of
Iraq, Elizabeth Wilmshurst, deputy legal adviser to the British Foreign Office and a member of the PrepCom working group defining aggression, resigned because she believed “an unlawful use of force on such a scale
amounts to the crime of aggression.”66 The Security Council never passed a
second resolution authorizing recourse to force, and on March 20, 2003, the
U.S.- and U.K.-led coalition invaded Iraq.67 To date, despite repeated calls
in the media68 and by opposition parties69 for prosecution, no charges have
63. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 5(1)(d), 5(2), 121, 123.
64. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, June 15–July 17, 1998, Final Act, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10
(July 17, 1998).
65. Note from Lord Goldsmith, Attorney General, to Tony Blair, Prime Minister, Gov’t of the U.K.
(Mar. 7, 2003), available at http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page7445.asp. In 2006, the House of
Lords, invited to rule on this exact question, came to the opposite conclusion. See infra note 76 and
accompanying text.
66. Wilmshurst Resignation Letter, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Mar. 18, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
uk_news/politics/4377605.stm (last visited Nov. 13, 2007).
67. For differing arguments on the legality of the Iraq conflict, see generally Agora: Future Implications
of the Iraq Conflict, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 553 (2003).
68. Richard Overy, Comment, Coalition in the Dock: There is a Strong War Crimes Case Against US
and British Leaders, but Big Powers Have Immunity, GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 15, 2003, at 17; Robert
Verkaik, Politics & Parliament: Court Studies Blair ‘War Crimes’ Claim, INDEPENDENT (London), Jan.
21, 2004, at 8; Thomas Walkom, Op-Ed., Tide Turns Against Bush, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 11, 2003, at
A17.
69. The Green Party of Ohio passed a policy proposal at their January 2004 State Convention to try
President George W. Bush, Vice President Richard Cheney, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
for the crime of aggression against Iraq. Noting that there is no statute of limitations on war crimes, the
Green Party pledged to “aggressively pursue US citizens . . . responsible for the March 2003 invasion of
Iraq . . . when Green Party members hold public office.” GREEN PARTY OF OHIO, WAR CRIMES PROPOSAL—2003 IRAQ INVASION (Jan. 31, 2004), http://www.ohiogreens.org/war_crimes_proposal.html. The
proposal was forwarded to the 2004 Green Party of the U.S. National Convention for consideration.
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been pressed domestically or internationally against coalition leaders for the
crime of aggression.
In December 2003, Saddam Hussein was captured by American troops
near Tikrit.70 He was charged, inter alia, with the invasion of Kuwait.71 The
trial was conducted domestically, not internationally. Rather than include
aggression alongside genocide (art. 11), crimes against humanity (art. 12),
and war crimes (art. 13), core international crimes appearing in this sequence in the Statute of the ICC, the drafters of the Statute of the Iraqi
Special Tribunal placed it in part 5, “Violations of Stipulated Iraqi Laws.”
According to article 14(c):
The Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons who have committed the following crimes under Iraqi law:
...
(c) The abuse of position and the pursuit of policies that may lead to
the threat of war or the use of the armed forces of Iraq against an Arab
country, in accordance with Article 1 of Law Number 7 of 1958, as
amended.72
By anchoring the prohibition on the use of force in domestic rather than
international law, the drafters insulated coalition leaders against accusations
that they had also committed the crime of aggression, as defined in the
Statute of the Special Tribunal.73 Though prosecutors indicted Saddam Hussein for the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, they prioritized the al-Dujail campaign that involved a range of crimes against humanity on Iraqi territory.
Saddam Hussein was hanged before a case under article 14(c) got underway.
In March 2003, two peace activists snuck into a Royal Air Force base in
Gloucestershire, England, and, in an attempt to prevent bombing in Iraq,
used hammers and bolt cutters to damage fuel tankers and trailers.74 At
their trial, the activists cited a 1977 law providing that “a person may use
such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime,”
claiming that their actions were a legally justified attempt to prevent the
crime of aggression.75 The bench found that the crime of aggression is cus70. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, President Bush Addresses Nation on the
Capture of Saddam Hussein: Remarks by the President on the Capture of Saddam Hussein (Dec. 14,
2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031214-3.html.
71. Transcript: Saddam’s Arraignment, FOX NEWS, July 1, 2004, http://www.foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,124433,00.html.
72. Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal art. 14(c), 2003, http://www.cpa-iraq.org/human_rights/
Statute.htm.
73. José E. Alvarez, Trying Hussein: Between Hubris and Hegemony, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 319, 319
(2004). For more on the tu coque defense, see TAYLOR, supra note 14, at 400–01, 409 (Admiral Dönitz
acquitted of illegal submarine warfare because he had produced an affidavit from U.S. Admiral Nimitz
saying Nimitz had done the same thing).
74. Peace Activists “Broke into Base,” BBC NEWS, Sept. 4, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/
england/gloucestershire/5313020.stm (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
75. R v. Jones [2006] UKHL 16 (appeal taken from Eng.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd060329/jones.pdf.
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tomary international law, but not U.K. criminal law absent legislative approval, and an attempt to prevent it is therefore not a legal justification at a
criminal trial.76 For proponents of the crime of aggression, R v. Jones was
both a vindication and a setback.77 It vindicated the crime of aggression as
customary international law and put political and military leaders on notice
that the United Kingdom considers the crime “sufficiently certain to be
capable of being prosecuted in international tribunals.”78 At the same time,
the Lords retreated from Attorney General Goldsmith’s assertion that the
crime of aggression is automatically part of the law of England, requiring
the additional step of legislative approval before they would condone its
enforcement in a U.K. court.
Between 1999 and 2002, the PrepCom met ten times to complete,
among other things, a definition of the crime of aggression and the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction for the purpose of article 5(1)(d) of the
Rome Statute.79 In 2002, the Coordinator of the PrepCom Working Group,
Argentine diplomat and legal expert Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi, consolidated the most popular proposals from the ten meetings into a succinct
“discussion paper” resembling the definition of a crime, but including various options to reflect the main points of contention.80 Fernández de
Gurmendi’s discussion paper was the closest anyone had come since the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials to a workable definition for use by a criminal
court. The discussion paper is reproduced here:
2002 Draft Definition of the Crime of Aggression and
Conditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction
1. For the purpose of the present Statute, a person commits a “crime of
aggression” when, being in a position effectively to exercise control
over or to direct the political or military action of a State, that person
intentionally and knowingly orders or participates actively in the planning, preparation, initiation or execution of an act of aggression which,
by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a flagrant violation of the
Charter of the United Nations.
Option 1: Add “such as, in particular, a war of aggression or an act
which has the object or result of establishing a military occupation of,
or annexing, the territory of another State or part thereof.”

76. Id. at 7–14.
77. See Donald M. Ferencz, Introductory Note to United Kingdom House of Lords: R v. Jones et al.,
45 I.L.M. 988, 988–91 (2006).
78. R v. Jones, supra note 75, ¶ 99.
79. See Documents on the Crime of Aggression, Preparatory Commission for the Int’l Crim. Ct.
(1999–2002), http://www.un.org/law/icc/documents/aggression/aggressiondocs.htm.
80. Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Crim. Ct., Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, July
1–12, 2002, Discussion Paper Proposed by the Coordinator, PCNICC/2002/WGCA/RT.1/Rev.2 (July 11,
2002) [hereinafter Coordinator’s 2002 Discussion Paper].
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Option 2: Add “and amounts to a war of aggression or constitutes an
act which has the object or the result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, the territory of another State or part thereof.”
Option 3: Neither of the above.
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means an act
referred to in United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314
(XXIX) of 14 December 1974, [The Definition of Aggression discussed above] which is determined to have been committed by the
State concerned,
Option 1: Add “in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5.”
Option 2: Add “subject to a prior determination by the Security
Council of the United Nations.”
3. The provisions of articles 25, paragraphs 3 [listing types of individual criminal responsibility], 28 [on command responsibility] and 33
[on Superior orders and prescription of law], of the Statute do not apply to the crime of aggression.
4. Where the Prosecutor intends to proceed with an investigation in
respect of a crime of aggression, the Court shall first ascertain whether
the Security Council has made a determination of an act of aggression
committed by the State concerned. If no Security Council determination exists, the Court shall notify the Security Council of the situation
before the Court so that the Security Council may take action, as
appropriate:
Option 1: under Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations [empowering the Security Council to determine the existence of an act of
aggression and take measures to restore international peace and
security].
Option 2: in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of
the United Nations.
5. Where the Security Council does not make a determination as to the
existence of an act of aggression by a State:
Variant (a) or invoke article 16 [Security Council may defer an ICC
investigation or prosecution for 12 months if it threatens international
peace and security] of the Statute within six months from the date of
notification.
Variant (b) [Remove variant a.]
Option 1: the Court may proceed with the case.
Option 2: the Court shall dismiss the case.
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Option 3: the Court shall, with due regard to the provisions of Articles
12, 14 and 24 of the Charter [procedure to coordinate S.C. and G.A.
functions regarding international peace and security], request the General Assembly of the United Nations to make a recommendation
within [12] months. In the absence of such a recommendation, the
Court may proceed with the case.
Option 4: the Court may request
Variant (a) the General Assembly
Variant (b) the Security Council, acting on the vote of any nine
members,
to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice, in
accordance with Article 96 [provision empowering the Security Council, General Assembly or other specialized U.N. agency to request an
ICJ advisory opinion] of the Charter and article 65 of the Statute of the
International Court [procedure for requesting an advisory opinion from
the ICJ], on the legal question of whether or not an act of aggression
has been committed by the State concerned. The Court may proceed
with the case if the International Court of Justice gives an advisory
opinion that an act of aggression has been committed by the State
concerned.
Option 5: the Court may proceed if it ascertains that the International
Court of Justice has made a finding in proceedings brought under
Chapter II of its Statute [establishing the competence of the ICJ] that
an act of aggression has been committed by the State concerned.
The 2002 draft definition revealed three core issues that states would
need to negotiate and resolve in order for the crime of aggression to be
conceptually complete and coherent. The finished crime would require a
detailed description of the prohibited state/collective act—a contemporary
answer to the historic debate over what constitutes an illegal or unjust war
(paragraph 2). Next, the crime would require linking one or more individuals to the state/collective act and limiting the range of responsibility to a
clearly defined set of perpetrators (paragraphs 1 and 3). Finally, a completed
provision must harmonize the ICC and the existing international architecture—the Security Council, General Assembly, and International Court of
Justice—regulating the use of force between states (paragraphs 4 and 5).
When the mandate of the PrepCom ended in 2002, the Assembly of
States Parties created the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (“SWGCA” or “Working Group”) composed of interested member
states of the United Nations, specialized agencies, and accredited legal experts to negotiate, draft, and submit a proposal to the Assembly of States
Parties for consideration at the first Review Conference of the Rome Stat-
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ute.81 With the International Criminal Court up and running, a comprehensive definition in sight, and the most influential ICC skeptics self-selected
out of the 2009 or 2010 plenary voting on the supreme international crime,
crucial elements were in place to recapture the Nuremberg moment.
II. CONTOURS

OF THE

EMERGING CRIME

Under the leadership of Christian Wenaweser, Liechtenstein’s permanent
representative to the United Nations, and hosted by Princeton University’s
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, the SWGCA took up Silvia
Fernández de Gurmendi’s 2002 discussion paper, systematically addressing
and debating points of contention.82 According to Jutta BertramNothnagel, team leader on the crime of aggression for the non-governmental
Coalition for the International Criminal Court, the Princeton venue was
conducive to in-depth exchanges. The atmosphere of these meetings83 was
informal and, owing to an online discussion in the lead-up to the meetings
that brought new delegates up to speed and alerted veterans to the latest
proposals, the committee quickly delved into legal issues. In early 2007,
Chairman Wenaweser disseminated a new discussion paper that built upon
Fernández de Gurmendi’s 2002 draft and reflected the progress of the
Working Group to date.84 Wenaweser’s 2007 paper became the basis for the
provision on the crime of aggression. The text of the discussion paper states,
in relevant part:85
2007 Discussion Paper on the Crime of Aggression
Proposed by the Chairman
I. Definition of the crime of aggression and conditions for the
exercise of jurisdiction
Insert new article 8 bis (entitled “Crime of Aggression”) into the Rome Statute:
Variant (a):
1. For the purpose of the present Statute, a person commits a “crime of
aggression” when, being in a position effectively to exercise control
81. The Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression is a subsidiary body of the Assembly of
States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. It is nevertheless open to all states
“on an equal footing.” ICC, Assembly of States Parties, 3rd plen. mtg., Continuity of Work in Respect of the
Crime of Aggression, ¶ 2, ICC-ASP/1/Res.1 (Sept. 9, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/asp/
1stsession/report/english/part_iv_res_1_e.pdf.
82. See Coalition for the Int’l Crim. Ct., Issues and Campaigns, Crime of Aggression, http://www.
ICCnow.org/?mod=aggression (last visited Nov. 14, 2007), for reports, documents, and notes on the
Princeton meetings.
83. Three meetings were held in June 2004, 2005, and 2006.
84. ICC, Assembly of States Parties, Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, Resumed
5th Sess., New York, Jan. 29-Feb. 1, 2005, Discussion Paper on the Crime of Aggression Proposed by the
Chairman, ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/2 (Jan. 16, 2007), http://www.ICC-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5SWGCA-2_English.pdf [hereinafter Chairman’s 2007 Discussion Paper].
85. Internal references omitted.
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over or to direct the political or military action of a State, that person
(leads) (directs) (organizes and/or directs) (engages in) the planning,
preparation, initiation or execution of an act of aggression/armed attack
Variant (b):
1. For the purpose of the present Statute, a person commits a “crime of
aggression” when, being in a position effectively to exercise control
over or to direct the political or military action of a State, that person
orders or participates actively in the planning, preparation, initiation
or execution of an act of aggression/armed attack.
Continue under both variants:
[which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations] [such as, in particular, a war
of aggression or an act which has the object or result of establishing a
military occupation of, or annexing, the territory of another State or
part thereof].
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means an act
referred to in [articles 1 and 3 of] United Nations General Assembly
resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974.86
Under variant (a) above:
3. The provisions of articles 25, paragraph 3(f) [on attempts], and [28]
[on command responsibility] of the Statute do not apply to the crime
of aggression.
Under variant (b) above:
3. The provisions of articles 25, paragraph 3 [listing types of individual
criminal responsibility], and [28] [on command responsibility] of the
Statute do not apply to the crime of aggression.
4. Where the Prosecutor intends to proceed with an investigation in
respect of a crime of aggression, the Court shall first ascertain whether
the Security Council has made a determination of an act of aggression
committed by the State concerned. If no Security Council determination exists, the Court shall notify the Security Council of the situation
before the Court.
5. Where the Security Council does not make such a determination
within [six] months after the date of notification,
Option 1: the Court may proceed with the case.
Option 2: the Court may not proceed with the case.

86. For the text of articles 1 and 3 of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3314, see infra text accompanying note 94.
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Option 3: the Court may, with due regard to the provisions of articles
12, 14 and 24 of the Charter [procedure to coordinate Security Council
and General Assembly functions regarding international peace and security], request the General Assembly of the United Nations to make
such a determination within [12] months. In the absence of such a
determination, the Court may proceed with the case.
Option 4: the Court may proceed if it ascertains that the International
Court of Justice has made a finding in proceedings brought under
Chapter II of its Statute [establishing the competence of the ICJ] that
an act of aggression has been committed by the State concerned.

Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi’s 2002 draft stimulated three distinct discussions and Christian Wenaweser’s 2007 paper reflects progress made in
these sub-fields, most importantly in turning intractable debates, such as
the role of the Security Council in determining the jurisdiction of the ICC,
into myriad gray-area options. In 2005, Christian Wenaweser assigned subcoordinators to prepare discussion papers on each sub-field in order to structure the June 2006 meeting at Princeton. Discussion Paper 1, prepared by
the German delegate Claus Kress, addressed the issue of individual criminal
responsibility for the crime of aggression: “How will the proposed definition of the individual’s conduct square with the provisions of article 25 (individual criminal responsibility), paragraphs 3(a) to (d) in the [Rome]
Statute, which describe the forms of participation in a crime?”87 Discussion
Paper 2, drafted by the Swedish delegate Pal Wrange, considered the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction.88 The third Discussion Paper, drafted
by veteran Greek diplomat Phani Dascalopoulou-Livada, dealt with the definition of the state/collective act of aggression as an element of the individual
crime of aggression.89
These discussions can be advanced by considering competing positions
from the perspective of the ICC Prosecutor’s missions, of which there are
three: (1) to fairly, effectively, and impartially investigate, prosecute, and
conduct trials of the most serious crimes; (2) to contribute to long lasting
respect for and the enforcement of international criminal justice, the prevention of crime, and the fight against impunity; and (3) to do so transparently
87. ICC, Assembly of States Parties, Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, 4th Sess.,
Nov. 28-Dec. 2, 2005, Discussion Paper 1: The Crime of Aggression and Article 25, Paragraph 3, of the Statute,
annex II.B, ICC-ASP/4/32, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/annexes.pdf [hereinafter Discussion Paper 1].
88. ICC, Assembly of States Parties, Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, 4th Sess.,
Nov. 28-Dec. 2, 2005, Discussion Paper 2: The Conditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction with Respect to the
Crime of Aggression, annex II.C, ICC-ASP/4/32, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/annexes.pdf
[hereinafter Discussion Paper 2].
89. ICC, Assembly of States Parties, Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, 4th Sess.,
Nov. 28-Dec. 2, 2005, Discussion Paper 3: Definition of Aggression in the Context of the Statute of the ICC,
annex II.D, ICC-ASP/4/32, available at http://www.ICC-cpi.int/library/asp/annexes.pdf [hereinafter Discussion Paper 3].
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and efficiently.90 Answering the question of the strategic challenges that
will face the ICC Prosecutor as he or she prepares an aggression case under
the different formulations is one way to begin to answer the broader question of what an aggression case will look like and, ultimately, the fundamental question of whether criminalizing aggression is a worthwhile endeavor.
The remainder of this article will shed light on the first of these questions,
touch on the second, and invite the reader to draw his or her own conclusions on the third.
A. The Definition of the State/Collective Act of Aggression
An act of aggression by a state or a group—a collective—must first be
proven for an individual to be held responsible for the crime of aggression.
The nature of an act of aggression is a controversial question that has been
debated by generations of just war theorists and legal scholars.91 In 1974,
the U.N. General Assembly adopted a consensus definition of aggression
meant to guide the Security Council in its determinations.92 The core of this
definition is a generic chapeau defining aggression and providing a nonexhaustive, illustrative list of aggressive acts. Despite the many criticisms
raised against the 1974 definition by the International Law Commission and
others, it is regularly cited as customary international law and therefore
serves as the basis of the SWGCA discussion of the state/collective act.93 It is
reproduced below:

90. ICC, Assembly of States Parties, 5th Sess., Nov. 23-Dec. 1, 2006, Strategic Plan of the International
Criminal Court, pt. IV, ICC-ASP/5/6 (Aug. 4, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICCASP-5-6_English.pdf.
91. For examples of the background literature, see JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION
AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR: A MORAL AND HISTORICAL INQUIRY (1981); JAMES TURNER JOHNSON,
THE HOLY WAR IDEA IN WESTERN AND ISLAMIC TRADITIONS (1997); JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, MORALITY & CONTEMPORARY WARFARE (1999); MOHAMMAD TAGHI KAROUBI, JUST OR UNJUST WAR? INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UNILATERAL USE OF ARMED FORCE BY STATES AT THE TURN OF THE 20TH
CENTURY (2004); TRADITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ETHICS (Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel eds.,
1993); James F. Childress, Just War Theories: The Bases, Interrelations, Priorities, and Functions of Their
Criteria, 39 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 427, 427–45 (1978); James F. Childress, Moral Discourse About War in
the Early Church, in Peace, Politics, and the People of God 117, 117–34 (Paul Peachey ed., 1986); Sohail
Humayun Hashmi, Interpreting the Islamic Ethic of War and Peace, in THE ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE:
RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR PERSPECTIVES 146, 146–68 (Terry Nardin ed., 1996).
92. Strapatsas, supra note 49, at 159; AHMED RIFAAT, INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION (1979); Julius
Stone, Hopes and Loopholes in the 1974 Definition of Aggression, 71 AM. J. INT’L L. 224 (1977); 2 BENJAMIN
B. FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION (1975).
93. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14
(June 27), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/9973.pdf. The Court finds that article 3,
paragraph (g) of the 1974 Definition of Aggression, “the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State,” may
“be taken to reflect customary international law.” Id. ¶ 195. In 2003 the attorney general of the United
Kingdom concluded that aggression was a crime under customary international law, which automatically
formed part of U.K. domestic law. Lord Goldsmith, Iraq: Resolution 1441, GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 7,
2003, ¶ 34, http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2005/04/28/legal.pdf.
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1974 Definition of Aggression: United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX)
Article 1
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as
set out in this definition.
Article 2
The First use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter
shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression although
the Security Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude
that a determination that an act of aggression has been committed
would not be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances including the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of
sufficient gravity.
Article 3
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and in accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an
act of aggression:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory
of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of
force of the territory of another State or part thereof,
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory
of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of
another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air
forces, or marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory
of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the
agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at
the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups,
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against
another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or
its substantial involvement therein.
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Article 4
The acts enumerated above are not exhaustive and the Security Council
may determine that other acts constitute aggression under the provisions of the Charter.
Article 5
1. No consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic,
military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression.
2. A war of aggression is a crime against international peace. Aggression gives rise to international responsibility.
3. No territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting from aggression is or shall be recognized as lawful.
Article 6
Nothing in this Definition shall be construed as in any way enlarging
or diminishing the scope of the Charter, including its provisions concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful.
Article 7
Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3, could in any
way prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that
right and referred to in the Declaration on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination: nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek
and receive support, in accordance with the principles of the Charter
and in conformity with the above-mentioned Declaration.
Article 8
In their interpretation and application the above provisions are interrelated and each provision should be construed in the context of the other
provisions.94
1. Generic Versus Specific Definition
Though the 1974 definition is mixed, combining a generic chapeau in
article 1 with a non-exhaustive enumerative list of specific acts amounting
to aggression in article 3, the SWGCA has not yet decided whether the
definition of the state/collective act should be generic, specific, or mixed.
Delegates who support a generic definition argue that it is impossible to
foresee all situations amounting to acts of aggression and include them in
the definition. Furthermore, some add, if the Rome Statute is to contain a
specific list, as opposed to a generic definition, it might encroach on the
94. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 41, annex, arts. 1–8.
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power of the Security Council to determine what amounts to an act of aggression. Delegates preferring the specific approach, on the other hand, argue that a list of acts is more likely to accord with the principle of legality
for the sake of a criminal trial. Those promoting a generic definition reply
that the provision could be drafted specifically enough to accord with the
principle of legality. Proponents of the specific approach warn that it may be
difficult to draft a generic definition that captures certain idiosyncratic acts
of aggression included in the 1974 list, such as the blockade of ports.95 The
Working Group expressed its preference in 2005 for a generic definition,
but in 2006 the tide shifted to a mixed model, including both a generic
chapeau and a list.96 The Chairman’s 2007 Discussion Paper97 and his 2007
Non-Paper on Defining the State Act of Aggression both include a generic
chapeau and a list, indicating the dominance of the mixed model.98
Delegates considered two formulations of the mixed model. In the first
formulation, a generic chapeau is combined with an exhaustive list. The
strength of this formulation is its specificity, while its weakness is that it
does not resolve the question of emerging forms of aggression. The second
formulation, mirroring the 1974 G.A. resolution, includes a generic chapeau
and a non-exhaustive, illustrative list. This formulation accommodates
emerging forms of aggression but, because of its open-endedness, threatens
to violate the principle of legality. However, the fact that a generic chapeau
with a non-exhaustive, illustrative list mirrors the formulation used in article 7 of the Rome Statute defining crimes against humanity has assuaged
many delegates.99 Proponents of the mixed approach with a non-exhaustive
list contend that the chapeau could be drafted with sufficient clarity to ensure adherence to the principle of legality. The drafting of the Coordinator’s
2007 Non-Paper on Defining the State Act of Aggression—“[a]ny of the
following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with
United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December
1974, qualify as an act of aggression”—was ambiguous as to whether the
95. Id. annex, art. 3(c).
96. THE COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., INFORMAL INTER-SESSIONAL MEETING OF THE SPECIAL
WORKING GROUP ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, LIECHTENSTEIN INSTITUTE ON SELF-DETERMINATION,
WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, UNITED STATES, FROM 8 TO 11 JUNE, 2006,
REPORT OF THE CICC TEAM REPORT ON AGGRESSION, at 4–5 (Aug. 26, 2006), http://www.ICCnow.org/
documents/TeamReportOnIntersessionalMeeting_26Aug06.pdf [hereinafter CICC 2006 REPORT].
97. Chairman’s 2007 Discussion Paper, supra note 84, ¶ 2.
98. Non-Paper by the Chairman on Defining the State Act of Aggression, in ICC, Assembly of States Parties,
Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, 6th Sess., Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, United States, June 11–14, 2007, Report of the
Informal Inter-sessional Meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, annex IV, ICC-ASP/6/
SWGCA/INF.1, available at http://www.ICC-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-6-SWGCA-INF.1_English.
pdf [hereinafter 2007 Non-Paper on Defining the State Act of Aggression].
99. Roger Clark, the Rutgers Law Professor representing Samoa at SWGCA, claims that “the openended characteristics of Article 7(1)(k) which has to be read ejusdem generis with all that comes before” is
“much more constricted than some of the generic approaches to aggression would have it.” E-mail from
Roger Clark to author (Apr. 27, 2007) (on file with author).
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list that follows is open or closed.100 This drafting ambiguity may help generate consensus among states, but it also creates uncertainty for a prosecutor
deciding whether to investigate and prosecute unlisted acts of aggression.
In June 2006, former Nuremberg Prosecutor Benjamin Ferencz suggested
an alternative generic definition that did not rely exclusively on G.A. Resolution 3314. Instead, Ferencz’s model would empower ICC judges to look to
the combined body of international and national jurisprudence and make a
determination that an act of aggression had occurred:
In determining whether an individual has committed the crime of aggression, the ICC judges shall apply the following:
1. Relevant provisions of the UN Charter;
2. The Charter and Judgment of the International Military Tribunals
as affirmed by the UN General Assembly in 1946;
3. The consensus definition of aggression in GA Res. 3314 of 1974;
4. The definition of aggression by the International Law Commission
in 1996;
5. Rules for interpreting international law as laid down for the International Court of Justice established by the Charter of the United
Nations;
6. Relevant judicial decisions by other competent international criminal tribunals;
7. National laws and decisions relating to the crime of aggression.101
Ferencz’s proposal is reminiscent of the approach taken by the bench at the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. Both draw from a body of
declarations and precedents rather than a single statutory definition as the
basis for the state/collective act. Ferencz argues that states have already
agreed to these instruments and hopes that “nations will be able to accept
what they have already accepted and move forward from there.”102 Opponents invoke the principle of legality and cite the lack of specificity of the
Ferencz model, a familiar criticism leveled at the judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The idea did not garner much support due to the vagueness of such a provision and it was left out of the
Chairman’s 2007 Discussion Paper and Non-Paper on Defining the State
Act of Aggression.103

100. ICC, Assembly of States Parties, Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, 6th Sess.,
Informal Inter-sessional Meeting of Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, held at Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, United States, June 11-14, 2007, ¶ 47,
ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/INF.1, available at http://www.ICC-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-6-SWGCA-INF.1
_English.pdf [hereinafter SWGCA 2007 Report].
101. Benjamin B. Ferencz, Enabling the International Criminal Court to Punish Aggression, pt. I.B
(unpublished article), http://www.benferencz.org/arts/90.html.
102. Id.
103. 2007 Non-Paper on Defining the State Act of Aggression, supra note 98.
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The debate about the approach to the definition of the state/collective act
of aggression involves high political stakes. Delegates have competed to create a definition that prohibits the unfavorable military operations of their
adversaries while permitting those advantageous for themselves. Not surprisingly, countries influential on the Security Council favor S.C. decisionmaking. The push by some Middle Eastern states to include G.A. Resolution 3314 in its entirety for the sake of articles 3(b)(c)(g) and article 7 constitutes another example of political calculations factoring into the debate.
At stake for the Prosecutor is the specificity and inclusiveness of the
crime. A specific list would allow the Prosecutor to fit a fact pattern into a
clearly defined contingency, such as the blockade of a port or the sending of
armed bands into the territory of a rival, and a generic chapeau would empower him or her to argue for the inclusion of acts not already in the list,
such as computer network attacks. A list would also enable the Prosecutor to
make the argument that a certain unforeseen act fits loosely within one of
the enumerated acts, rather than building the claim from scratch. In short, a
Prosecutor would most benefit from a mixed model with a carefully worded
chapeau that is general enough to include unforeseen acts, yet specific
enough to accord with the principle of legality.
2. Describing the State/Collective Act of Aggression
At Princeton in 2006, delegates debated a number of terms describing
the quality of the prohibited state/collective act, including “use of force,”
“armed attack,” “act of aggression,” and “use of armed force.”104 By the
2007 meeting in New York, the range was narrowed to two dominant options: “act of aggression” and “armed attack.” The former provides a clear
body of precedents and documents on which parties will rely in building
their case, while the latter raises several unanswered questions in this regard.
“Act of aggression” appeals to delegates because it is a key term in article
39 of the Charter of the United Nations, the lead provision in Chapter VII,
Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts
of Aggression. “Act of aggression” is also defined in G.A. Resolution 3314,
so use of the term in the criminal provision would help harmonize the Rome
Statute, the U.N. Charter, and G.A. Resolution 3314. “Armed attack,” a
term used in article 51 of the U.N. Charter pertaining to self-defense, was
taken to be narrower, capturing only the “gravest violations.”105 It was also
seen by most proponents as a self-contained alternative to “act of aggression,” rendering paragraph 2 of the chairman’s 2007 paper obsolete and
disengaging the crime of aggression from the 1974 definition of the state
act. Thus, if armed attack is the chosen term, the question becomes what
precedents and documents the Prosecutor should rely on and the bench
104. CICC 2006 REPORT, supra note 96, at 5.
105. Id. at 6–7.
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should consider when making a determination that an armed attack has occurred. To date, the Working Group has not provided any answers.
States unsympathetic to Resolution 3314 for military or political reasons
therefore have a motivation to back “armed attack” over “act of aggression”
as a way to phase out the 1974 definition. However, absent consideration of
the components of “armed attack” and the documents that will give the
term meaning, it is not possible to properly compare the political costs and
benefits of the two options. The most that can be concluded is that “armed
attack” is the narrower term, which excludes certain acts of aggression contained in the 1974 G.A. definition, such as the blockade of ports. A nation
with a strong navy that prefers to leave the option open to resort to blockades has an impetus, among other considerations, to support “armed
attack.”
The SWGCA has carefully avoided discussing the controversial distinction between “act of aggression” or “armed attack” on one hand, and “selfdefense” on the other, preferring to leave the determination to the Security
Council or the ICC judges rather than draft it into the provision. If the
SWGCA decides that G.A. Resolution 3314 should be the basis for describing the state/collective act,106 under article 2 the first use of armed force will
constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression, but other considerations, such as a contrary Security Council determination or the fact that the
acts concerned are not of sufficient gravity, will also be relevant. It seems
clear that a conscientious defense team will attempt not only to portray their
client as the victim of aggression, but also to expand the scope of the doctrine of self-defense to include anticipatory and possibly even preemptive
self-defense. Similar tactics will likely ensue if the SWGCA embraces
“armed attack,” though the precise placement of the burden of proof and
the means by which a state would be able to overcome a prima facie case
remain unclear.
The outcome of the debate over the term describing the state/collective
act is of relevance to the Prosecutor since, insofar as he or she values predictability, he or she benefits from specific categories over general terms. The
term “act of aggression,” which would link the crime to the 1974 G.A.
definition, is broader than “armed attack,” but it is also more finely grained
due to article 3, which sets out a list of prohibited acts. Whichever term is
chosen, after the 2007 meeting in New York, it seems unlikely that the
Prosecutor will be able to rely exclusively on a prejudicial determination by
an outside organ as an element of the crime. To avoid shifting the burden of
proof onto the defendant, any state/collective acts will have to be proven to
the bench, meeting evidentiary and procedural standards and subject to rebuttal by the defense.

106. This seems highly probable.
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3. The Threshold
Qualifiers are meant to raise the threshold on illegal acts of aggression so
that spurious cases are filtered out. Though the majority of intervening delegations in the Working Group spoke out against a qualifier in 2006—a
violation is a violation, they argued107—there was still significant support
for a qualifier and, in his 2007 discussion paper, the chairman included
three threshold mechanisms as options that could be used independently or
combined: (1) a violation of the U.N. Charter must be “flagrant” or “manifest” to attract individual criminal responsibility; (2) the violation must
amount to a “war of aggression” and any act of aggression not meeting this
demanding threshold would fail to attract individual criminal responsibility; and/or (3) the object or result of the acts of the aggressor must meet
particular threshold standards, such as being aggression with the “object or
result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, the territory of
another State or part thereof.”108
The Coordinator’s 2002 Discussion Paper uses the “flagrant” threshold.109 For a state/collective act of aggression to attract individual criminal
responsibility, it must, “by its character, gravity and scale” constitute “a
flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”110 By 2006, the
delegates of the SWGCA were expressing a preference for the “manifest”
qualifier over “flagrant” because they felt the meaning of the term “manifest” —clear, apparent, evident—was slightly more obvious than “flagrant.”111 In his 2007 discussion paper, the chairman completely dropped
“flagrant” and maintained “manifest.” Some delegates argue that there is
no need to include either qualifier in the definition, since a threshold is
already built into the preamble of the Rome Statute: the jurisdiction of the
court is limited to “the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community.” An act of aggression—the use of armed force by a state against
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another
state—is serious enough without further qualification.112 Furthermore, because of their seriousness, the Statute does not include qualifiers for genocide
(e.g., a “flagrant” or “manifest” genocide) and should not include a qualifier
for aggression.113 However, states wishing to raise the threshold yet
higher—some intending to distinguish humanitarian intervention from aggression—continue to promote the “manifest” or “flagrant” qualifier.
107. CICC 2006 REPORT, supra note 96, at 6.
108. Coordinator’s 2002 Discussion Paper, supra note 80, ¶ 1, options 1 and 2.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. ICC, Assembly of States Parties, Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, 5th Sess.,
Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, ¶ 8, ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/1 (Nov. 29, 2006),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-SWGCA-1_English.pdf [hereinafter SWGCA
2006 Report].
112. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 41, annex, art. 1.
113. CICC 2006 REPORT, supra note 96, at 6.

R
R

R
R

\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-1\HLI104.txt

unknown

Seq: 27

2008 / Prosecuting Aggression

26-DEC-07

13:16

187

Though the “manifest” and “flagrant” mechanisms are primarily meant
to filter out spurious referrals, adding one of these subjective terms to the
chapeau would also grant the ICC Prosecutor another discretionary tool to
withdraw or stop an ill-fated case. Delegates intending to equip the Prosecutor with an additional avenue to stop a case pressed to include the “flagrant”
or “manifest” threshold, while those hoping to increase the deterrent impact
of the crime of aggression by widening its scope preferred to omit the
qualifier.
Most delegates viewed limiting ICC jurisdiction to “wars of aggression”
or acts “tantamount to a war of aggression” as too restrictive in light of
G.A. Resolution 3314, which, in article 3, includes acts not amounting to a
war of aggression such as “the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force
against another State . . . .” The argument for including the “war of aggression” threshold was that it would bring the ICC definition in line with
customary international law as established by the Nuremberg precedent.
However, the “war of aggression” qualifier raises challenging and divisive
questions. In the absence of an explicit declaration of war, what criteria
should ICC judges use to distinguish a war of aggression from an act—or a
series of acts—of aggression? Are states the only collectives that can wage
war, or are non-state actors also captured under the “war of aggression”
qualifier? Can a state wage a war of aggression against a non-state entity, or
do these operations fall into another category that does not attract individual
criminal responsibility? These highly politicized issues are not unsolvable,
but they pose added negotiation challenges.
Moreover, most delegates reject the insertion of the third proposed
threshold mechanism, which includes the object or result of the act of aggression in the chapeau.114 They argue that including the object or result
would encroach on jus in bello, whereas the crime of aggression is traditionally distinguished as jus ad bellum, a distinct area of law. In addition, argue
the opponents, it would be difficult to reach agreement on an exhaustive list
of prohibited objects or results. Delegates argued that the Security Council
does not refer to the object or result of aggression in its resolutions, so
neither should the International Criminal Court.115
Nevertheless, in addition to the “manifest” qualifier contained in the
2007 discussion paper, the chairman included another possible qualifier
specifying the object or result of the prohibited state/collective act: “such as,
in particular, a war of aggression or an act which has the object or result of
establishing a military occupation of, or annexing the territory of another
State or part thereof.”116 A number of states, presumably with Israel in
mind, pressed to recognize acts seeking to or resulting in military occupa114. Id. at 6–7.
115. Id.
116. Chairman’s 2007 Discussion Paper, supra note 84, art. 1, ¶ 2.
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tion in the definition so as to recognize the continuity of an act of aggression
after an initial attack has occurred. One delegate characterized each day of an
occupation as an independent act of aggression. Another delegate responded
that G.A. Resolution 3314 conceives of military occupation as a continuum
and simply incorporating Resolution 3314 into the definition of the crime
of aggression would have the desired effect. Either proposal, if adopted,
would expose to criminal prosecution the leaders of states that took territory
before the crime of aggression came into force but continue to hold it when
the Court is finally empowered to prosecute. Meanwhile, some delegates
prioritized territorial annexation as an object or result attracting criminal
responsibility in order to rule out prosecution in situations where the use of
force was meant to serve a purpose unrelated to territorial acquisition, such
as in the event of terror attacks.
4. The Reference to General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX)
Should G.A. Resolution 3314 become the basis of the definition of the
state/collective act, another consideration is whether it is preferable to include it in whole or in part. The definition of the crime of aggression can
link with G.A. Resolution 3314 in one of three ways: (1) the definition can
refer to the resolution generically, in its entirety; (2) the definition can make
reference to specific parts of resolution 3314; or, (3) the definition can
reproduce parts of the text of the resolution itself.117
The issue has not been resolved, but by January 2007 a large number of
delegates appeared to favor the incorporation of a generic reference to Resolution 3314 in its entirety. A generic reference would preserve the integrity
of the resolution and respect the interconnected nature of its provisions.118
Delegates supporting a reference to Resolution 3314 in its entirety remind
the Working Group that the rule of interpretation for Resolution 3314 is
contained in article 8 of the resolution itself: “In their interpretation and
application the above provisions are interrelated and each provision should
be construed in the context of the other provisions.” Moreover, proponents
of a generic reference to Resolution 3314 add that a piecemeal approach
threatens to repeat the debate over which provisions should be included and
excluded, a debate that took years to resolve in the run up to the adoption of
the 1974 Resolution.
Those opposed to a generic reference argue that Resolution 3314 lacks the
degree of specificity required in criminal law and would violate the principle
of legality. In particular, they argue that incorporating article 4 of the 1974
definition, which establishes that the enumerated acts in article 3 are not
exhaustive and that the Security Council may determine that other acts con117. SWGCA 2006 Report, supra note 111, at 8.
118. Id.
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stitute aggression, would violate the maxim nullum crimen sine lege:119 the
definition of the crime would impermissibly occur after the criminal act.
Proponents respond by noting that a generic reference relates to the state/
collective act, not the conduct of the individual perpetrator, and, because the
state/collective act is a circumstantial element of the crime, a generic reference to Resolution 3314 would not violate the principle of legality. However, this response does not resolve the problem of selecting a definition of
the state/collective act as an element of the crime itself.
Delegates critical of Resolution 3314 and delegates who prefer to prolong
the negotiations have a stake in reopening this debate. Delegates who would
reopen the debate come from various political positions: some would
strengthen the resolution, while others would dilute it. Those delegates critical of the crime of aggression in whatever form it may take could delay the
solution of the debate by encouraging the Working Group to reopen thorny
issues.
Some articles of the 1974 Resolution significantly increase the certainty
of the definition and thus facilitate the Prosecutor’s task. For instance, according to article 2, “[t]he first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of
aggression . . . .” The “first use” criterion, though not decisive, would eliminate a great deal of wrangling over the characterization of an act of aggression and, insofar as legal certainty facilitates the Prosecutor’s work, be
beneficial. Article 5, which rules out every justification for aggression,
“whether political, economic, military or otherwise,” also makes the definition more certain.
5. Attempt and Threat
Including attempted or threatened aggression by a state/collective would
broaden the range of acts covered by the crime. Most delegates rejected such
expansion, preferring instead to narrow the range of acts resulting in liability. Still others argued that it was unnecessary to include state/collective
attempts because they felt that attempt was already covered in the existing
definitions of the state/collective act. They argued that the “use of armed
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another
state”120 does not require the crossing of a border or physical damage to
amount to an act of aggression. Many delegates confused attempt in relation
to the state/collective act of aggression with individual attempt, which pertains to article 25(3)(f) of the Rome Statute—“attempts to commit such a
119. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 22 (“Nullum crimen sine lege: 1. A person shall not be criminally
responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; 2. The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and
shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the
person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.”)
120. G.A. Resolution 3314, supra note 41, annex, art. 1.
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crime by taking action that commences its execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent
of the person’s intentions”—and refers to individual involvement in the
planning, preparation, initiation or execution of an act of aggression/armed
attack.
The inclination to exclude attempt from the definition of aggression has
significant repercussions for an ICC Prosecutor building an aggression case.
Attempted aggression has the potential to pose major evidentiary challenges. It is difficult enough to prove the existence of an attack, damage, and
causal responsibility, let alone a failed act that has left little or no trace.
Furthermore, the Security Council, already hesitant to adopt resolutions that
overtly declare that aggression has occurred, can be expected to be even
more reticent to determine the more dubious question of attempt.
By 2006, the prospect of including “threat of aggression” in the definition of the state/collective act was even less popular than in previous years.
Delegates seemed intent on raising the threshold for the crime of aggression
and did not spend much time considering how to incorporate threat, which
they felt would lower the threshold. As a result of this emerging consensus,
the “threat of aggression” was dropped from the Chairman’s 2007 Discussion Paper. However, lack of enthusiasm in 2006 and 2007 does not mean
that the idea is obsolete, and the issue of threats, a key element of article
2(4) of the U.N. Charter, deserves more examination by legal scholars than
it has received to date.
B. Individual Participation in the Crime of Aggression
Article 25, paragraphs 3(a) to (d) of the Rome Statute, describes the forms
of individual participation in genocide (Art. 6), crimes against humanity
(Art. 7), and war crimes (Art. 8). The question facing the Working Group is
whether article 25(3)(a)–(d) of the Rome Statute should apply to the crime
of aggression and, if so, how. Article 25 of the Rome Statute on individual
criminal responsibility provides in relevant part:
Individual criminal responsibility
[. . .]
3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of
the Court if that person:
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible;
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in
fact occurs or is attempted;
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(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids,
abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission;
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common
purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or
criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to
commit the crime;
(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites
others to commit genocide;
(f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences
its execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not
occur because of circumstances independent of the person’s intentions.
However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or
otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for
punishment under this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if
that person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.
Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute has created a rift between so-called
“monistic” and “differentiated” schools in the Working Group. Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi’s 2002 discussion paper reflects the dominance of the
monistic school at the time, while Christian Wenaweser’s 2007 draft mirrors the tide shift towards the differentiated school. The monistic school
would produce a draft that uniquely makes article 25(3) inapplicable to the
crime of aggression. Instead, unlike the other crimes, the definition of the
crime of aggression itself would include the different forms of culpable individual conduct. The conduct element of a monistic provision would be based
on the following model:
For the purpose of the present Statute, a person commits a “crime of
aggression” when, being in a position effectively to exercise control
over or to direct the political or military action of a State, that person
orders or participates actively in the planning, preparation, initiation
or execution of an act of aggression/armed attack . . . .121

121. Chairman’s 2007 Discussion Paper, supra note 84, ¶ 1, variant (b).
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In the monistic draft above, the words “orders or participates actively” are
meant to replace the various forms of participation listed in article
25(3)(a)–(d) of the Rome Statute.
Under the now-dominant differentiated approach, the forms of individual
participation listed in article 25(3)(a)–(d) of the Rome Statute are applied to
the crime of aggression.122 The differentiated provision includes a conduct
verb (e.g., leads, directs, organizes and/or directs, engages in) that links with
article 25(3)(a)–(d). A differentiated provision would be based on the following model:
For the purpose of the present Statute, a person commits a “crime of
aggression” when, being in a position effectively to exercise control
over or to direct the political or military action of a State, that person
(leads) (directs) (organizes and/or directs) (engages in) the planning,
preparation, initiation or execution of an act of aggression/armed
attack. . . .123
In terms of draftsmanship, at stake in the debate over the monistic and
the differentiated approaches is the simplicity versus the inclusiveness of the
definition. A monistic definition would be parsimonious—“simple and coherent,” according to Claus Kress124—while a differentiated definition,
specifying the various forms of participation, has the potential to offer more
detailed guidance and accord more strictly with the principle of legality.125
The differentiated approach would also retain the consistency of the Rome
Statute by treating aggression like the other crimes.126 Under the differentiated approach, however, the drafters would need to pay particular attention
to the compatibility of the definition of the crime with forms of individual
participation in article 25(3) of the Rome Statute. Especially, the drafters
must solve the problem of duplicate verbs in paragraph 1 of the crime and in
article 25(3)(a)–(d). How does an individual aid and abet the organizing or
directing of the state/collective act? The monistic approach, which uses the
generic term “participates” to describe the prohibited conduct, sidesteps
most compatibility problems.127 The monistic approach also has the advan-

122. In 2007, the Chairman found “broad support” in the Working Group for the differentiated
approach. SWGCA 2007 Report, supra note 100, ¶ 7.
123. Chairman’s 2007 Discussion Paper, supra note 84, ¶ 1, variant (a).
124. Discussion Paper 1, supra note 87, at 377.
125. The principle of legality requires an individual contemplating a crime to have enough guidance
from a criminal prohibition to distinguish permitted and prohibited conduct.
126. SWGCA 2007 Report, supra note 100, ¶ 6.
127. For an example of a compatibility problem, see Discussion Paper 1, supra note 87, ¶ 3: “Take only
one example: If the word ‘participate’ is used in the definition of the crime and if Article 25, paragraph
3(c) of the Statute is applied, the result would be that an aider in the crime of aggression would be
someone who ‘aids in the participation in [the collective act]’. That would not seem to make much
sense.”
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tage of being more akin to the definition of aggression used at the Nuremberg trials, which is often cited as customary international law.128
In January 2007, Chairman Wenaweser put forward two new differentiated proposals that successfully address many of the compatibility problems
with the original.129 The “Revised Proposal,” which is meant to replace
variant (a) of paragraph 1 of the Chairman’s 2007 Discussion Paper, mirrors
the grammatical structure of the other crimes in the Rome Statute:
For purposes of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the planning,
preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively
to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a
State, of an act of aggression/armed attack . . . .130
Because of its improved drafting, this “Revised Proposal” is further impetus
for states to adopt the differentiated over the monistic approach. However,
at this stage, in the midst of high political considerations, it is difficult to
assess the degree to which sophisticated drafting will influence the choices
of Foreign Offices at the ICC’s first Review Conference.
The key political factor in defining the crime of aggression in general is
the scope of the crime. Some states prefer that the crime of aggression captures a wide array of perpetrators, while others negotiate to limit the jurisdiction of the ICC over aggression by narrowing the definition. The problem
in terms of choosing a monistic or differentiated approach based on scope is
that it is far from clear which approach is more restricted. For example, in
variant (b) of the chairman’s 2007 paper, the monistic option fully captures
the range of prohibited conduct in the short phrase, “that person orders or
participates actively in.” Whether this phrase is narrower or broader than
the hodgepodge of narrowing and expanding verbs in article 25(3)(a)–(d) of
the Rome Statute—commits (individually, jointly, with another, through
another), orders, solicits or induces, aids, abets or otherwise assists, provides
the means for its commission, in any other way contributes to the commission of the crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose—is
difficult to ascertain, absent concrete jurisprudence on the issue.
As a result of this ambiguity, states’ political preferences regarding the
reach of the crime do not translate predictably into preferences for monistic
or differentiated approaches. Christian Wenaweser notes, “[m]any delegations indicated along those lines that they were flexible on this issue [monistic or differentiated], although they had expressed a preference for one of the
two variants.”131
128. R v. Jones, supra note 75; Strapatsas, supra note 49, at 157.
129. SWGCA 2007 Report, supra note 100, annex II.
130. Id.
131. ICC, Assembly of States Parties, Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, 5th resumed Sess., New York, Jan. 29–Feb. 1, 2007, Annex II: Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression, ¶ 9, ICC-ASP/5/35, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/Report_SWGCA_English.
pdf.
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On the other hand, a leadership qualifier is an important component common to both the monistic and differentiated drafts, even though it is incontrovertible that the leadership qualifier yields a narrower crime. The vast
majority of delegates from both monistic and differentiated schools agree
that the leadership qualifier should be an integral component of the crime.
The leadership qualifier, transposed from article 1 of the monistic 2002 discussion paper, ensures that only individuals “in a position to effectively exercise control over or to direct the military action of a state” are held
responsible.132 The issue here is that the delegates disagree on whether it
should be a jurisdictional requirement133 or part of the definition itself.134
As a jurisdictional condition, the leadership qualifier serves to raise the
threshold on aggression cases that the ICC can try.135 On the other hand, if
the leadership qualifier is part of the definition itself, it shapes the very
concept of the crime of aggression, so that aggression becomes a crime committed by leaders, not subordinates.
Because the definitions of crimes in the Rome Statute are meant to be
incorporated into national criminal codes, but ICC-specific jurisdictional
conditions are not, the leadership qualifier must be a component of the definition itself to penetrate domestic law. If the leadership qualifier remains
only a jurisdictional requirement for ICC cases and not a component of the
definition incorporated into national law, nation states could enlarge the
scope of the crime of aggression in national jurisdictions to include subordinates, which is not a prospect the majority of Working Group delegates
intends. Furthermore, because the evolution of customary international law
is influenced by national legislation and the decisions of domestic courts,
leaving the leadership qualifier out of the definition itself risks generating a
rift between ICC law and customary international law over time, potentially
“undermin[ing] the leadership nature of the crime,” and creating legal in132. SWGCA 2007 Report, supra note 100, annex II. For an argument that the leadership qualifier
should also include private economic actors, see Kevin Jon Heller, Retreat from Nuremberg: The Leadership
Requirement in the Crime of Aggression, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2007).
133. The proposal for alternative language in variant (a) prepared by the chairman in January 2007
reads as follows:

R

The Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to the crime of aggression when committed by a
person being in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or
military action of a State.
For purposes of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the planning, preparation, initiation
or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the
political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression/armed attack . . . .
SWGCA 2007 Report, supra note 100, annex II.
134. Id. The revised proposal for alternative language on variant (a) prepared by the chairman for the
informal consultations is reproduced, supra, text accompanying note 130.
135. THE COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., INFORMAL INTER-SESSIONAL MEETING OF THE SPECIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, LIECHTENSTEIN INSTITUTE ON SELF-DETERMINATION, WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, UNITED STATES, JUNE 11-14, 2007,
REPORT OF THE CICC TEAM REPORT ON AGGRESSION, at 5 [hereinafter CICC 2007 REPORT] (on file
with author).
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determinacy.136 Legal indeterminacy is problematic for the ICC Prosecutor
insofar as he or she is unable to ascertain what standard he or she must meet
when building an aggression case until the court rules.
As a possible solution, delegates intent on “deeply ingrain[ing]” the leadership clause in general criminal law and the legislation and jurisprudence of
nations, suggested incorporating the clause into article 25(3) of the Rome
Statute,137 under the General Principles of Criminal Law.138 Including the
leadership clause under the General Principles is an effective way to limit
the scope of prosecution by excluding secondary perpetrators. However, critics argue that this solution, which hinges on article 25(3), excludes the possibility of a monistic definition, undermines the coherence of the Rome
Statute by inserting specific exceptions into the General Principles, and/or
fails to fully capture the concept of the crime of aggression as a crime committed by leaders.
A crime capturing a broad scope of perpetrators opens strategic opportunities for an ICC Prosecutor intent on advancing his or her mandate in the
most efficient way possible. For instance, in many national jurisdictions including the United States, it is common practice for a prosecutor to indict a
secondary perpetrator, and then offer immunity in exchange for previously
inaccessible evidence incriminating the primary perpetrator. And yet, a
broad crime offering the Prosecutor strategic advantages must be defined
with certainty for it to insulate the Prosecutor from de-legitimizing claims
that he or she is exercising unfettered discretion in a biased and politicized
manner.
A definition that is certain uses objectively (i.e., empirically) verifiable
terms that allow the Prosecutor to anticipate what evidence and elements he
or she must present in order to link the individual to the state/collective act
of aggression. A certain definition also accords most closely with the principle of legality by forewarning potential perpetrators of what acts are prohibited with some degree of precision. Faced with a plethora of potential
aggression cases, the criminal process corresponds optimally with the rule of
law when the crime itself, rather than unfettered prosecutorial discretion, is
the basis for eliminating potential targets.
The history of Nuremberg indictments based on article 6(a) of the
London Charter is a warning to those drafting the contemporary crime of
aggression. Article 6(a) is a remarkably broad provision with an uncertain
scope, offering the Allied prosecutors little guidance, a vast domain of discretion, and potentially violating the principle of legality due to the vagueness of the undefined term, “war of aggression.” It reads: “CRIMES
136. SWGCA 2007 Report, supra note 100, ¶ 11.
137. CICC 2007 REPORT, supra note 135, at 7.
138. The suggestion reads, “Article 25: add new paragraph 3 bis: ‘With respect to the crime of
aggression, the provisions of the present article shall only apply to persons being in a position effectively
to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State.’ ” Id.
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AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a
war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements
or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.”139 The drafting of article 6(a) and its
interpretation by the Allied prosecutors in the indictment against the Nazi
leaders resulted in an exaggerated number of acquittals for charges of crimes
against peace.140 Nuremberg Prosecutor Robert Jackson sought to put the
Nazi organizations themselves on trial, after which a simple finding of
membership would result in liability for a targeted individual. Jackson’s
interpretation was fully justified based on the plain language of 6(a), but the
Nuremberg Tribunal ultimately rejected it in favor of a far narrower formulation, severely damaging the prosecutor’s case. Had article 6(a) been drafted
narrowly, with certain terms, and in accordance with the principle of legality, the Allied prosecutors would have had the opportunity to build a much
more stable case.
Because it is unclear which approach—monistic or differentiated—is
broader or narrower, and whether a broader or narrower definition benefits
the ICC Prosecutor, the line of inquiry based on scope offers little guidance
to delegates at the review conference. In terms of certainty, however, the
differentiated approach would increase the certainty of the provision and
offer the Prosecutor a richer set of objective terms with which to describe
the defendant’s conduct. Moreover, with successive judgments, the bench
will have the opportunity to hone the conduct element of the crime of aggression further, bringing it still closer to the ideal of legality and giving
the Prosecutor a clearer standard upon which to base future cases.
C. Conditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction
The most contentious and politicized issue for successive working groups
charged with defining the crime of aggression has been establishing the conditions that must be fulfilled in order for the Court to exercise jurisdiction.
Beyond establishing a just and effective jurisdictional regime for the ICC,
this discussion relates to the appropriate role of the Security Council in the
contemporary international order.141 At issue in the debate is the balance to
be struck between judicial process and political control.
139. London Charter, supra note 14, art. 6(a).
140. Only eight of twenty-two Nazi leaders charged with conspiracy were convicted. See Stanislaw
Pomorski, Conspiracy and Criminal Organization, in THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
213, 235 (George Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev eds., 1990).
141. See generally Paula Escarameia, The ICC and the Security Council on Aggression: Overlapping Competencies?, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, supra note 13, at 133;
Giorgio Gaja, The Respective Roles of the ICC and the Security Council in Determining the Existence of an Act of
Aggression, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, supra note 13, at
121; Marja Lehto, The ICC and the Security Council: About the Argument of Politicization, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, supra note 13, at 145; Saeid Mirzaee
Yengejeh, Reflections on the Security Council in Determining an Act of Aggression, in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, supra note 13, at 125.
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Under article 39 of the U.N. Charter, “[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall
be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute acknowledges
the primacy of the Charter and requires the definition of the crime of aggression to be “consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations.”142 The interpretation of this provision is a matter of controversy in the Working Group.143 Delegates have been debating whether
the ICC, when faced with an aggression case, should proceed in the same
way it does with the other crimes in accordance with article 13 of the Rome
Statute (the general provision on the exercise of jurisdiction), or whether a
special jurisdictional procedure involving the Security Council, the General
Assembly, the International Court of Justice, or an expanded Pre-Trial
Chamber is necessary to ensure compliance with the U.N. Charter. At
Princeton in 2005, the Working Group divided the debate over U.N. Charter compliance into a number of questions,144 of which four are central: (1)
Should the ICC exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression only after
another U.N. organ has accepted such exercise? (2) If the answer to the
previous question is “yes,” which organ (the Security Council, General Assembly, International Court of Justice, or a combination) should first accept
the exercise? (3) What sort of decision should be reached (a determination
that a state act of aggression has occurred and/or an explicit “go-ahead” for
the ICC to exercise jurisdiction)? (4) Should the decision that a state act of
aggression has occurred be prejudicial (i.e., binding on the ICC judges)? The
answers have important repercussions on the integrity of the international
legal regime, the independence of the ICC, the rights of the accused, and the
Prosecutor’s task.
1. Should the ICC Exercise Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression Only
After Another U.N. Organ Has Accepted Such Exercise?
Delegates’ positions on this question divide roughly into three camps:
those arguing that a prior determination by a particular U.N. organ should
be required for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction, those convinced that the

142. “For those who opposed recognizing any role of the Security Council, any express mention to
[sic] the Council in Article 5 would have been unacceptable.” Silvia A. Fernández de Gurmendi, An
Insider’s View, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, supra note 13,
at 183.
143. For details on the Working Group debate, see SWGCA 2006 Report, supra note 111, ¶ 9; see also
ICC, Assembly of States Parties, 4th Sess., Nov. 28-Dec. 3, 2005, Official Records of the Assembly of States
Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, annex II.C., ICC-ASP/4/32, available at http://
www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/annexes.pdf.
144. See Discussion Paper 2, supra note 88, at 386–87.
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Court must be able to act independently, and those supporting one of the
“gray area” proposals.145
Delegates who favor a prior determination by a U.N. organ argue that
article 5(2) of the Rome Statute requires U.N. involvement.146 Proponents
of the S.C. determination argue that articles 24 and 39 of the U.N. Charter
specifically require S.C. authorization and that any alternative would be a
violation. These arguments are buttressed by claims that the ICC should
reinforce the existing institutional framework, not undermine it by seizing
jurisdiction absent a determination by the appropriate U.N. organ, as well
as by some delegates’ claims that a specialized U.N. organ would be better
equipped than ICC judges to answer the public international law question of
whether aggression has occurred.147 Those who favor prior determination
further note that requiring an outside determination by an authoritative
U.N. body will insulate the ICC Prosecutor from accusations that an aggression case is politically motivated, since the Prosecutor would be proceeding
on the basis of a determination by a duly empowered U.N. organ.148
Those convinced that the ICC must be empowered to act independently
counter that article 39 of the U.N. Charter contemplates determinations by
the Security Council for the sole purpose of maintaining international peace
and security, not for establishing criminal responsibility.149 They invoke article 24 of the U.N. Charter, which refers to the primary, not exclusive, authority of the Security Council to maintain international peace and security,
and conclude that the Security Council is not the only body with the authority to determine that an act of aggression has occurred.150 Delegates taking
this position also cite examples of determinations of acts of aggression by
other U.N. organs, including the General Assembly, the International Court
of Justice, and states themselves.
The criticism that ICC judges are not competent to evaluate the use of
force by states is rebutted by pointing out that the Nuremberg Tribunal
capably assessed acts of aggression and related defenses and that the ad hoc
U.N. Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda ably made determinations of public international law. Moreover, those favoring ICC independence argue that there are methods other than a “go-ahead” issued by a
145. Australia proposed that the Security Council get “the first bite of the cherry, but not necessarily
the last.” CICC 2006 REPORT, supra note 96, at 12. For various possibilities, see Coordinator’s 2002
Discussion Paper, supra note 80, art. 5.
146. There is a distinction between the issue of a predetermination for the sake of ICC jurisdiction
and the issue of using this predetermination as a prejudicial, or binding, element of the crime itself. It
would be possible, for instance, to draft a crime requiring a U.N. organ to give a “go-ahead” for the sake
of jurisdiction, but then require the Prosecutor to independently prove the existence of a state/collective
act of aggression for the sake of individual criminal responsibility.
147. See Lehto, supra note 141, at 186, citing Prof. Thedeor Meron, U.S. Rep., Statement at the ICC
Preparatory Commission, Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (Dec. 6, 2002).
148. See id.
149. See, e.g., Yengejeh, supra note 141, at 132.
150. See id.
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U.N. organ that could be employed to insulate the Prosecutor from claims
of politicized prosecution. For example, in January 2007, Belgium proposed
a jurisdictional filter whereby an aggression case referred by a state party or
initiated by the Prosecutor proprio motu could only be instigated if authorized
by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC convening in full session.151
The “gray area” proposals are compromises meant to garner a broader
consensus among competing camps. One such proposal is found in paragraph 5 of the 2007 Discussion Paper. According to this proposal, the Security Council has what one delegate called “the first bite of the cherry.”152
There are then four options if the U.N. Security Council fails to make a
determination that an act of aggression has occurred. Under option 1, the
court may proceed with a case. Under option 2, the court may not proceed
with the case.153 Under option 3, the cascade continues and the court requests the General Assembly to make a recommendation within a certain
number of months. In the absence of a recommendation to the contrary, the
court may proceed with the case. Option 4 involves the International Court
of Justice. In option 4, the ICC may proceed if it ascertains that the ICJ has
made a finding in a contentious case that an act of aggression has been
committed.
In May 2007, at an international justice conference in Turin, David
Scheffer, former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, put forth
two additional proposals aimed at compromise while still granting substantial control to the Security Council. Scheffer’s first proposal expands the
scope of Security Council language capable of triggering a case against an
individual for the crime of aggression beyond “act of aggression”—a term
the Security Council rarely uses—to include, for example, “threats to or
breaches of international peace and security” and “unlawful use of force.”154
In Scheffer’s second proposal, the Security Council has three ways to trigger
a case: (1) It can make a determination that a state has committed an act of
aggression; (2) it can refer a situation in which the crime of aggression appears to have been attempted or committed to the ICC, which then looks to
the Security Council or the General Assembly for a resolution, or the International Court of Justice for a decision or advisory opinion;155 or (3) it can
151. Proposal Presented by Belgium on the Question of Jurisdiction of the Court with Respect to the Crime of
Aggression, in ICC, Assembly of States Parties, Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, 5th
Sess., The Hague, Jan. 29–Feb. 1, 2007, Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute,
ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/WP.1 (Jan. 29, 2007).
152. See supra note 145.
153. Option 2 thus gives the Security Council final say and is no compromise at all.
154. E-mail from the Turin conference chairman Judge Roberto Bellelli, containing David Scheffer’s
Proposal, to author (May 24, 2007 4:09:16 PM GMT+02:00) (on file with author). The proposal is also
available in ICC, Assembly of States Parties, 6th Sess., Policy Issues Under the United Nations Charter and the
Rome Statute, at 30, ICC-ASP/6/INF.2 (Aug. 21, 2007), available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/
Turin_Report_English_21-08-07_ADVANCE_COPY.pdf [hereinafter Scheffer Proposal].
155. According to Scheffer, (2) and (3) are compromises because they entail “passing the buck” to
other bodies, but in a way that remains within the initial control of the Security Council. See Scheffer
Proposal, supra note 154, at 2.
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explicitly require for the initiation of the investigation the ICC’s judgment
whether an act of aggression has been committed by the State concerned.
While Scheffer’s first proposal addresses the issue of S.C. reluctance to make
explicit determinations that an act of aggression has occurred, and the second creates the possibility that the ICC itself could make this determination, neither option resolves the potential problem of S.C. veto-holders
shielding their own or allied political and military leaders.
The debate over the need for authorization from a U.N. body is of great
political and prosecutorial significance, as it is essentially a debate about the
independence of the court versus the court’s position within the existing
“institutional architecture for global security.”156 An independent court—
one able to act without a go-ahead from a U.N. body—raises concerns about
a rogue prosecutor launching criminal cases to advance political agendas.
However, the numerous checks and balances built into the Rome Statute,
including the gate-keeping role of the Pre-Trial Chamber and the Security
Council’s ability under article 16 to defer an investigation for twelve-month
renewable intervals, mitigate these concerns. Furthermore, the Prosecutor’s
long-term legitimacy and effectiveness are contingent upon his or her independence and impartiality. Making the ICC dependent on the political
wrangling of the veto-holding members of the Security Council may undermine the fair administration of justice and, ultimately, the Prosecutor’s legitimacy. It is conceivable that the Prosecutor’s legitimacy would be
diminished if a majority of the Security Council agreed that an act of aggression occurred but prosecution was blocked by a single veto-holding member. On the other hand, the alternative view is that if the Council decides
not to make a determination, there is probably a sensible political reason for
the decision, and responsibility for such decisions should rest fully with the
Security Council.157
2. Which United Nations Organ Is Best Suited to Make the Determination?
Most Working Group delegates agree that the Security Council has “primary” (i.e., initial) responsibility for determining whether an act of aggression has occurred.158 Disagreement revolves around the appropriate next step
in the event that the Council declines or fails to make a determination.
Besides those delegates who feel that the ICC should proceed on its own or,
156. CICC 2006 REPORT, supra note 96, at 10. For a summary of the various positions of the Preparatory Commission members, see Escarameia, supra note 141, at 139.
157. In response to this claim, one delegate reminded the Working Group of the failure of the Security Council to act decisively and prevent the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.
158. See Coordinator’s 2002 Discussion Paper, supra note 80, ¶¶ 4–5; Non-Paper Submitted by the Chairman on the Exercise of the Jurisdiction, in ICC, Assembly of States Parties, Special Working Group on the
Crime of Aggression, 6th Sess., Informal Inter-sessional Meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression, held at Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University,
United States, from 11 to 14 June 2007, annex III, ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/INF.1, available at http://www.
ICC-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-6-SWGCA-INF.1_English.pdf.
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alternatively, that the ICC should drop the case absent a Security Council
go-ahead, there are others who argue that one of the other U.N. organs
should be asked for a determination. Each supports their preferred organ,
guided by legal ideals or political interests.
It is not unusual for states without a powerful presence in the Security
Council to press for a determination by either the General Assembly or International Court of Justice. Proponents of the General Assembly support
the third option of paragraph 5 of the 2007 Discussion Paper, which, in the
absence of a Security Council determination within six months, empowers
the Assembly to make the determination instead. They invoke the Uniting
for Peace Resolution of 1950,159 whereby the General Assembly, faced with
recurrent Security Council deadlocks, exerted authority over determinations
relating to the use of force and subsequently condemned armed attacks in a
number of violent crises.160 Proponents of I.C.J. authorization advance option 4 of the 2007 draft, which involves the World Court in a determination
that an act of aggression has occurred. Proponents of I.C.J. involvement remind the Working Group that the International Court of Justice is experienced at making legal determinations related to acts of aggression and
point to the recent Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo,161 the
1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion,162 the 1986 Nicaragua Case,163
and the 1962 Certain Expenses of the United Nations164 in support of this
view.
Opponents of G.A. or I.C.J. involvement argue that the procedural and
evidentiary standards of these U.N. organs differ significantly from rigorous
ICC standards and are therefore inappropriate. However, delegates who
would involve the Assembly or the World Court if the Security Council fails
to act point out that the procedural or evidentiary standards of the Council
are less rigorous than the standards of the International Court of Justice.
Furthermore, some add, as political determinations, Security Council resolutions are less representative of world opinion than G.A. resolutions.
The decision among the Security Council, ICC, General Assembly, and
the International Court of Justice has important prosecutorial consequences
because it affects the degree of international cooperation—an essential ingredient for a successful case—from which the Prosecutor will benefit.165 As159. See Uniting for Peace Resolution, supra note 37.
160. Eric Stein & Richard C. Morrissey, Uniting for Peace Resolution, 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L.
380 (1983).
161. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116,
¶ 244 (Dec. 19), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/116/10455.pdf.
162. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf.
163. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), supra note 93.
164. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 163 (July 20),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/49/5259.pdf.
165. On the need for the “full and unconditional cooperation of states and organizations” in order to
ensure the “swift fulfillment of the mandate of the Office of the Prosecutor,” see Third Report of the
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suming that the organ making the declaration of aggression will also be
inclined to cooperate with the ICC, the Prosecutor would benefit most from
a Security Council or G.A. resolution. Security Council cooperation is advantageous because the Council wields enforcement powers under chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter. Arrest and evidence-sharing are but two ways that
the Council can facilitate the Prosecutor’s task. Meanwhile, the General Assembly is the most representative U.N. body. It can help the Prosecutor
garner voluntary support from states parties that take exception to increasing the authority of the Security Council. Reliance on the International
Court of Justice is problematic because I.C.J. decisions require time to draft
and publish and thus potentially affect the rights of the accused to a prompt
trial. Nor do I.C.J. decisions garner the degree of consensus that a successful
G.A. resolution does, and the Court does not have the enforcement powers
that the Security Council does. However, an I.C.J. decision would be advantageous to the Prosecutor if it contains full-fledged legal arguments that can
be used by him or her when attempting to establish that a state/collective
act of aggression has occurred as an element of the crime.
Since 2007, a large number of states have begun to support formulations
of the crime of aggression that increase the authority of the ICC to make
independent determinations. The Chairman’s 2007 Non-Paper on the exercise of jurisdiction would require the Prosecutor to seek authorization by the
Pre-Trial Chamber for an investigation into the commission of the crime of
aggression.166 Following a procedure closely resembling the one contained in
article 15 of the Rome Statute for the initiation of proprio motu investigations
by the Prosecutor, the Pre-Trial Chamber looks for one of three triggers: (1)
a Security Council determination that the state identified by the Prosecutor
has committed an act of aggression;167 (2) whether the Security Council has
decided not to object to an investigation;168 or (3) a G.A. or an I.C.J. determination that an act of aggression has been committed.169 In the absence of
one of these three triggers, the Pre-Trial Chamber notifies the U.N. Secretary-General of the Prosecutor’s request to initiate an investigation, and
passes on all relevant information or documents. If no S.C., G.A., or I.C.J.
decision is made after a predetermined time period after the date of notification, the Pre-Trial Chamber may proceed to authorize the Prosecutor’s investigation. By giving all three U.N. organs a role in triggering ICC
jurisdiction, and directing the Prosecutor to the Pre-Trial Chamber, the
chairman’s non-paper proposal dilutes the influence of the Security Council
in relation to earlier proposals, while still giving the Council primary reProsecutor of the International Criminal Court to the U.N. Security Council Pursuant To UNSCR 1593 (2005)
(June 14, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/OTP_ReportUNSC_3-Darfur_English.
pdf.
166. 2007 Non-Paper on Defining the State Act of Aggression, supra note 98, ¶ 2.
167. Id. ¶ 3(a).
168. Id. ¶ 3(b).
169. Id. ¶ 3(c).
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sponsibility for determining acts of aggression. It also distances the Prosecutor from the Security Council by directing him or her to the Pre-Trial
Chamber for a jurisdictional go-ahead. While the proposed jurisdictional
procedure insulates the Prosecutor from the political process, it also risks
reducing his or her influence in the Council absent informal avenues of interaction, potentially jeopardizing cooperation.
3. What Sort of Decision Triggers ICC Jurisdiction?
Though most delegates agree that the Security Council should have primary (i.e., initial) responsibility for determining whether an act of aggression has occurred, they disagree over the type of determination that should
trigger ICC jurisdiction.
Delegates have considered three alternative procedures for moving a case
from the Security Council to the ICC, but none commanded enough support
to be included as the prevailing preference in the Chairman’s 2007 Discussion Paper. In order for the Prosecutor to proceed with a case under the first
alternative, the Council would need to determine that an act of aggression
had occurred and then refer the situation to the ICC in accordance with the
provision for S.C. referrals contained in article 13(b) of the Rome Statute.
Under the second option, a determination by the Council that an act of
aggression had occurred would be sufficient and no referral would be necessary. Under the third option, the Council could refer a situation in which
the crime of aggression appears to have been committed to the ICC under
article 13(b) of the Rome Statute without determining that an act of aggression had occurred. It would then be incumbent on the Court to answer the
legal question of whether an act of aggression had occurred for the sake of
establishing the criminal responsibility of the accused. All three options
give preferential treatment to the five veto-holding members of the Security
Council, which can ensure that a case against a local or allied political or
military leader is blocked before it reaches the Court.
The advantage of the first option—a Security Council determination plus
a referral—for the Prosecutor would be increased certainty that the Council
intended him or her to proceed with the case. Presumably, a decisive Council would be more cooperative with the Prosecutor than an indecisive one.
At the same time, this double requirement would make the Prosecutor dependent upon S.C. consensus for the trigger. Security Council paralysis
when confronted with a clear case of aggression risks eroding the authority
of the Prosecutor, who, in the absence of a determination and a “go-ahead,”
would be barred from proceeding.
Under the second option—in which a Council determination alone would
be sufficient—the ICC could proceed under any one of the three avenues
contemplated in article 13 of the Rome Statute: state referral, Council referral, or invocation of the Prosecutor’s proprio motu power. In the case of a state
referral or Pre-Trial Chamber authorization, this option would allow the
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Prosecutor to proceed with a case should the Security Council be resolved
that aggression had occurred but deadlocked on the merits of criminal
prosecution.
Under the third alternative, the Council could refer a situation to the ICC
and leave it open for the court to determine whether one of the crimes under
its jurisdiction had occurred. Some delegates argued that this alternative
would offer the Council new tools to deal with aggression. For example,
there are instances when the Council might prefer to remain silent but grant
responsibility to the ICC to judge that aggression had occurred. In addition
to giving the Security Council another power, this option would offer the
Prosecutor the most freedom to formulate criminal charges since a referral
that does not specify the alleged crime invites the Prosecutor to investigate
any crime within ICC jurisdiction. An open Council referral of this type
would, at the same time, leave the Prosecutor vulnerable to accusations that
the charges were politically motivated. Alternative options such as requiring
nine members of the Security Council to agree on a referral or making the
veto inapplicable in relation to ICC referrals were unpopular because they
would interfere with the Council’s powers to establish its own procedures.
Beyond the debate over a one- or two-step process by the Security Council, the Working Group discussed a number of ancillary procedural questions related to the specifics of the triggering resolution: (1) Should the
decision be taken under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, an enforcement
action responding to a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression? (2) Could such a decision be regarded as a procedural question
under article 27(2) of the U.N. Charter, thus circumventing the veto? and
(3) Should the decision or the determination be made only in an operative
or, alternatively, in a preambular paragraph of a Council resolution?170 Regarding question (3), a number of alternatives were discussed. Could the
determination be a decision in an operative paragraph using the word “determines” instead of “decides”? Would an explicit determination in a
preambular rather than an operative paragraph be sufficient? Could the
Council determination be implicit—identifying a state act as “aggressive,”
for instance? Answers to these questions would impact the work of the Prosecutor at two key points: when claiming ICC jurisdiction and when proving
the elements of the crime—the state/collective act in particular—in court.
The answers to these questions are relevant to the ICC Prosecutor insofar as
a wider array of permissible S.C. determinations will presumably increase
the range of potential situations to investigate.
Those delegates prepared to invoke the authority of the General Assembly
in the absence of a Council determination debated the required majority—
one-half or two-thirds of the Assembly—for the sake of ICC jurisdiction.
They were undecided as to whether a determination must be made in an
170. Discussion Paper 1, supra note 87, at 386.
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operative paragraph or if it might also be made in the preamble to a G.A.
resolution. Questions about the effect of implicit determinations arose in
relation to G.A. resolutions, as they had with Security Council determinations. Meanwhile, in the run-up to the 2010 Review Conference, recourse to
the General Assembly became increasingly unpopular because the Assembly,
without primary enforcement capacity or a judicial function, provided few
tangible advantages over the Security Council or the International Court of
Justice.
Delegates supporting the involvement of the International Court of Justice did not manage to reach a consensus on the question of whether an
advisory opinion or a judgment would trigger ICC jurisdiction. Delegates
familiar with I.C.J. procedures raised doubts about the propriety of sanctioning the ICC to accept a determination in an I.C.J. advisory opinion,
since the question of international aggression relates to a dispute between
states, and disputes between states at the International Court of Justice are
only adjudicated with the consent of the states involved.171 Nor could the
delegates decide whether an explicit request to the International Court of
Justice, an operative decision (ratio desiderata), or a decision made in the
reasons (obiter dictum) would suffice. Also unresolved was whether the characterization of the act of aggression by the International Court of Justice
should be explicit, or whether an implicit characterization would be enough
to trigger jurisdiction. While an I.C.J. decision concerning the state/collective act of aggression at the jurisdictional phase would facilitate the Prosecutor’s task when proving the elements of the crime, involving the Prosecutor
in an I.C.J. case or advisory opinion seems another distraction from his or
her primary responsibilities in the field and the courtroom of the ICC.
4. Should the Decision That a State Act of Aggression Has Occurred Be
Prejudicial?
In the Working Group discussion, a prior determination by an outside
organ is prejudicial if it is binding on the ICC and cannot be reviewed by
the Court. If a determination that a state/collective act of aggression occurred is prejudicial, the Prosecutor need only to show that the determination was made in order to meet the jurisdictional precondition and to satisfy
the state/collective act of aggression element of the crime. Neither the Prosecutor nor the defense can debate the content of a prejudicial determination.
Legal questions concern only its procedural validity. Today, there is consensus in the working group that a prejudicial determination would violate the
due process rights of the accused, that the Prosecutor must prove to the
171. Discussion Paper 1, supra note 87; 2007 Non-Paper on Defining the State Act of Aggression, supra note
98. The Proposal for alternative language on variant (a) was prepared by the chairman in January 2007,
and the Revised Proposal for alternative language on variant (a) was prepared by the chairman for the
informal consultations.
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Court that the state/collective act of aggression occurred as an element of the
crime, and that the accused must have an opportunity to respond.172
At stake politically in the debate over whether a determination should be
prejudicial was the authority of the Security Council vis-à-vis the Court. An
ICC decision at odds with a Security Council resolution determining that an
act of aggression has or has not occurred risks undermining the authority of
either or both institutions. Initially, proponents of the Council proposed
preventing this contingency by making S.C. determinations prejudicial. By
2006, a growing focus in the Working Group on the rights of the accused
had helped soften their positions. States critical of Council involvement in
ICC decisions reminded the Working Group of situations where the Council
had failed to act in the face of grave threats to international peace and security, invoking the 1994 Rwanda genocide in particular. Implicit in the arguments of some delegations against prejudicial S.C. determinations was the
hope that the ICC, unconstrained by the political pressures facing the Council, would produce a more objective and transparent assessment of acts of
aggression, possibly even serving as a benchmark to evaluate S.C. decisions.
For the Prosecutor, the outcome affects 1) the ease with which he or she
can establish the jurisdictional preconditions to start a case;173 2) the facility
of proving that a state/collective act of aggression, as an element of the
crime, has occurred; 3) the degree to which the provision insulates the Prosecutor from accusations that he or she has abused his or her discretion; and
4) the effect of the jurisdictional component of the aggression provision on
the overall legitimacy of the ICC. The more jurisdictional hurdles confronting the Prosecutor at the preliminary stages of the case—making a
jurisdictional case to the General Assembly or International Court of Justice
would be particularly demanding—the fewer the resources available for
other aspects of the case. In a related way, if an outside organ is responsible
for establishing the existence of the state/collective act of aggression as an
element of the crime, this reduces the burden on the Prosecutor. However,
making the outside determination prejudicial invites the accused to challenge the fairness of the provision and, in effect, the Prosecutor’s case, as a
violation of internationally recognized due process standards. A prejudicial
determination made after the crime is seen by many delegates as a violation
of the principle of legality because the contours of the crime remain unclear
until the post-crime determination has been made.
The Working Group framed the discussion as a dilemma: the desire for
harmony among different international institutions versus the due process
rights of the accused.174 According to Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel, by 2006,

172.
173.
act, the
174.

See CICC 2007 REPORT, supra note 135, at 9, 10, 13, 44, 48–49.
The more central the outside determination is in establishing the existence of the state/collective
less work the Prosecutor will have in proving it on the basis of evidence collected in the field.
CICC 2006 REPORT, supra note 96, at 28.
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“the latter was the stronger value.”175 In June 2006, there was consensus
that a prior determination by an outside organ must not be prejudicial.
Delegates agreed that a prejudicial decision, while ensuring harmony between the ICC and the U.N. organ making the determination, would compromise the rights of the accused, particularly the presumption of innocence.
Under articles 66 and 67 of the Rome Statute, the burden of proof must be
on the prosecution, and cannot be shifted to the defendant. Furthermore,
with time, new evidence might emerge that casts doubt on the determination that an act of aggression had occurred. Barring the ICC from reviewing
new and exculpatory evidence seemed to many delegates to be an unreasonable burden on the accused. The Working Group seemed prepared to empower the ICC to reconsider the state/collective act of aggression in
accordance with its own definition, thresholds, and standards of due
process.176
Protection of the ICC’s ability to make its own determination of whether
an act of aggression has occurred is likely to come in the form of a variant on
a proposal put forth by Chairman Wenaweser at Princeton in 2007.177 In his
discussion paper, the chairman attempted to assuage the concerns of those
delegates promoting harmony among different international institutions and
those guarding the due process rights of the accused. To accomplish this
goal, the chairman separated the provisions defining the crime of aggression
from the provision on jurisdiction into two distinct articles, 8 bis and 15 bis,
respectively. This opened the possibility of a self-contained definition of the
crime in 8 bis, immune from political interference and holding strictly to
the principle of legality, while retaining a role for an outside U.N. organ—
whichever organ is decided upon, whether it be the Security Council, General Assembly, or the International Court of Justice—in 15 bis, a new provision governing the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. In
this two-step process, an outside decision would function as a jurisdictional
“go-ahead” or “green light.”178 Pursuant to the “go-ahead” or “green
light,” the Prosecutor would still need to prove to the Court that state/
collective aggression meeting ICC thresholds occurred as an element of the
crime. According to Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel, the Chairman’s 2007 Discussion Paper, by separating the definition and the jurisdictional conditions, is
“a major step forward.”179 Those options incorporating prejudicial determinations—dropped in the Chairman’s 2007 Working Paper—would have
been advantageous for their capacity to limit the Prosecutor’s discretion,
insulating him or her from accusations of political bias at the stage of case
selection. But linking the ICC’s aggression case to an outside organ makes
175. Id.
176. “No one argued that a prior determination had to be prejudicial.” Id.
177. See Non-Paper Submitted by the Chairman on the Exercise of the Jurisdiction, supra note 158.
178. Id. at 19, 24.
179. E-mail from Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel to the delegation of experts of the Special Working
Group on the Crime of Aggression (Apr. 16, 2007) (on file with author).
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the legitimacy of the court’s decision contingent upon the legitimacy of that
organ and its determination.
D. The Direction of Future Compromise
In June 2006, one delegate listed seven possible ways that the Security
Council could affect ICC jurisdiction. The Council could (1) determine that
an act of aggression had occurred; (2) refer a case without a determination;
(3) make a referral and a determination; (4) refer a case and specifically empower the ICC to determine whether an act of aggression has occurred; (5)
request the Court, under article 16 of the Rome Statute, to suspend the
proceedings; (6) explicitly determine that no act of aggression had been
committed by the State concerned; or (7) do nothing.180
Another delegate suggested designing alternative jurisdictional preconditions that coincide with the three Rome Statute article 13 trigger mechanisms—state referral, S.C. referral, and proprio motu. For instance, a state
referring its own case, he suggested, should not be required to acquire a
Council determination that aggression had occurred to initiate the process.
If states are concerned about the Prosecutor instigating frivolous cases under
13(c), proprio motu, they can design a provision requiring an outside body to
make a determination before the Prosecutor can present a proprio motu case to
the Pre-Trial Chamber. The suggestion to align the jurisdictional preconditions with article 13 of the Rome Statute will most likely increase the complexity and sophistication of upcoming SWGCA discussions in the lead-up
to the 2009 or 2010 Review Conference. Already, Belgium has put forth a
proposal with alternative jurisdictional triggers designed to coincide with
the different referral procedures.181 Increasing the sophistication of the grayarea options improves the probability of a compromise at the review conference, a prospect not every state is keen to promote.
III. THE PROSECUTOR’S CHALLENGE
Part II demonstrated that many essential aspects of the definition of the
crime of aggression no longer give rise to disagreement and that the main
areas of contention, such as the consequence of the S.C. determination of an
act of aggression, have been translated into a myriad of gray-area options
designed to garner consensus and bring the Working Group closer to an
eventual definition. The exercise in Part II of examining, in detail, the status
of the definition to date also allows us to foresee the contours of the crime
with some clarity.
Part III forecasts the key challenges that all of the proposed definitions
present for the Prosecutor. These challenges are drawn from the emerging
180. CICC 2006 REPORT, supra note 96, at 22.
181. See supra note 151.
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definition of the crime described in Part II, the history of aggression cases
since Nuremberg, related experience prosecuting the other international
crimes, and the unique characteristics of the Rome Statute. The Prosecutor
is likely to encounter key challenges in (1) prompting the referral; (2) selecting the case; (3) linking the suspect to the state act; (4) arresting suspects;
and (5) establishing the legitimacy of the crime itself.
1. Prompting the Referral
Reflecting on the main challenges faced during his initial three years in
office, ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo identified his first challenge as
beginning cases.182 It is foreseeable that the highly divisive nature of the
crime of aggression will exacerbate the challenges.
There are various political reasons why states parties or the Security
Council would fail to refer a prima facie aggression case to the ICC. A draft
S.C. referral may be blocked by a veto-holding member protecting one of its
own leaders or an allied nation accused of aggression. States parties may be
unwilling to risk the diplomatic fallout of independently referring an aggression case against the leader of a powerful nation or an individual protected by such a nation. If the Prosecutor acts independently, proprio motu,
with only the authorization of the Pre-Trial Chamber, he or she might not
be in a position to galvanize the necessary international cooperation to investigate and arrest a suspect. Though referrals are within the power of states
parties and the Security Council, and the absence of a referral in the face of a
clear case of aggression is not the fault of the Prosecutor, the biased application of international criminal law is a threat to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the system as a whole, a system the Prosecutor is mandated to
safeguard.
Though states parties and the Security Council are responsible for referrals, the first three years of ICC operations demonstrate that the Prosecutor
has some influence over the process. In 2003, with many of the worst international crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction occurring in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, and no state or Council referral pending, Prosecutor
Moreno-Ocampo evoked the prospect of his proprio motu power in the Security Council chambers to successfully encourage—some would say compel—
a self-referral from the national government itself. In January 2004,
Moreno-Ocampo succeeded in negotiating a second self-referral, this time
from the government of Uganda, in a twenty-year conflict where Uganda’s
own political and military leaders would be vulnerable to prosecution. In
December 2005, in spite of American hostility, Russian and Chinese reticence, and Sudanese resistance to the ICC, the Security Council decided to
182. ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Report on the Activities Performed During the First Three Years (June
2003–June 2006) (Sept. 12, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTP_3-yearreport-20060914_English.pdf.
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refer Darfur to the Court, largely due to quiet diplomatic efforts on the part
of Moreno-Ocampo, who galvanized the Council—nine of fifteen members
were parties to the Rome Statute—and a coalition of NGOs and lobby
groups to push the referral through.183
Whatever jurisdictional trigger is ultimately incorporated for the crime of
aggression, the Prosecutor’s task will be greatly facilitated by including the
option of a state self-referral under article 14 of the Rome Statute. This
would invite successor regimes to surrender ousted political and military
leaders who planned, prepared, initiated, or executed illegal acts of aggression and trigger a case, supplying evidence of wrongdoing.184 Cases against
Slobodan Milošević, Saddam Hussein, and Augusto Pinochet were all instigated by successor regimes, and the majority of high-level cases in international criminal law since the creation of the U.N. ad hoc tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have also been triggered in this way. The
Prosecutor’s best strategy for initiating an aggression case is to collaborate
with domestic allies.
2. Selecting the Case
More perpetrators have committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the
ICC than a Prosecutor can conceivably try. The crime of aggression, unless
tailored narrowly, will exacerbate the “impunity gap.”185 Meanwhile, drafting the aggression provision too narrowly risks limiting the Prosecutor’s
discretion when selecting the cases that will most effectively advance his or
her mandate. At the same time, however, a crime drafted to give the Prosecutor ample discretion at the level of case selection makes him or her vulnerable to accusations of bias. When it comes to the crime of aggression, the
Prosecutor’s challenge is to devise a principled, transparent, and legitimate
approach to case selection, while still leaving himself or herself enough flexibility to effectively advance his or her mandate. Attuned to these challenges,
Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo has drafted a policy paper that sets out his approach to case selection.186
The Prosecutor’s guiding principles in selecting situations and cases are
independence (the Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”) “shall not seek or act
on instructions from any external source”),187 impartiality (“the OTP conducts its selection analysis in a nonpartisan manner, applying the same
methodology and standards for all groups”),188 objectivity (“the Office will
183. S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
184. With legislation implementing the Rome Statute into domestic law, the state could also try its
own leaders.
185. ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor, at 3 (Sept.
2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905_Policy_Paper.pdf.
186. Id.
187. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 42(1).
188. ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Criteria for Selection of Situations and Cases, at 2 (June 2006) (draft
policy paper on file with author) [hereinafter OTP Selection Criteria].
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investigate and consider incriminating and exonerating circumstances
equally, in order to establish the truth”),189 and nondiscrimination (“the
selection process of the Office does not draw any adverse distinction founded
on grounds such as gender, age, race, color, language, religion or belief,
political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or
other status”).190
In addition, gravity, described in detail in the policy paper, is the Prosecutor’s key selection criteria which does the most work in both situation and
case selection once the basic jurisdiction and admissibility preconditions are
met. According to the policy paper, the relevant factors in assessing gravity
are the scale (the number of victims and the geographic and chronological
spread of the crime), the nature (with deliberate killing and rape composing
the highest level of gravity), the manner of commission (“systematic, organized or planned course of action, elements of particular cruelty, crimes
against particularly vulnerable victims, crimes involving discrimination on
grounds referred to in Article 21(3), and abuse of de jure or de facto power”),
and the impact of the crimes (“on the community and on regional peace and
security, including longer term social, economic and environmental damage”).191 The OTP considers the four factors jointly, and does not assign
fixed weight to them.192
Meanwhile, trends in the Working Group indicate that the definition of
the crime of aggression will include additional gravity-based admissibility
criteria above and beyond the other crimes—a veritable “super-threshold”
specially designed for the supreme international crime.193 But sometimes it
is less effective to prosecute the “big fish” than it is to prosecute the “small
fry.”194 It may be logistically impossible to collect reliable evidence on top
political and military leaders due to an ongoing conflict, the Prosecutor’s
inability to ensure the safety of victims and witnesses in a particular region,
or insufficient cooperation by national and transnational actors. States may
not be willing to cooperate to investigate or prosecute the political or military leader of a powerful state for fear of diplomatic countermeasures, or
jeopardize their own troops for the sake of international justice. The investigation of particular crimes such as the enlistment and conscription of children into active hostilities,195 arguably less grave than large-scale massacres,
for instance, may contribute more effectively to the prevention of the crime,
advancing the Prosecutor’s mission of prevention. Prosecuting a mid-rank189. Id.
190. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 21(3).
191. OTP Selection Criteria, supra note 188, at 4–6.
192. Id. at 5.
193. See supra Part II.A.3.
194. Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1751, 1754 (2005).
195. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation
of Charges (Jan. 29, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-01-04-01-06-803tEN_English.pdf.
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ing official may lay the doctrinal or evidentiary foundations for a case
against his political masters.
The main risk, particularly with the crime of aggression, is that the Prosecutor will not have the capacity to bring the gravest perpetrators to justice
and will undermine the legitimacy of the ICC if he or she tries and repeatedly fails. One mechanism within the crime itself that would help mitigate
this problem and which is already likely to be included is the required predetermination by an outside organ or the Pre-Trial Chamber, convening in
full session. This would reduce the number of situations available to the
Prosecutor from which to draw his or her cases while presumably maximizing international cooperation to investigate and arrest. The weakness of this
mechanism is that the Prosecutor has less discretion to select the “small fry”
cases that best advance his or her mandate.
3. Linking the Suspect to the State Act
Contrasted with conventional crimes conducted by a single person or
small cabal, state atrocities are instead often the product of collective,
systematic, bureaucratic activity, made possible only by the collaboration of massive and complex organizations in the execution of criminal
policies initiated at the highest levels of government. How, then, is
individual responsibility to be located, limited, and defined within the
vast bureaucratic apparatuses that make possible the pulling of a trigger or the dropping of a gas canister in some far-flung place?196
The answer to David Cohen’s question in Beyond Nuremberg is now being
negotiated by the SWGCA. The outcome will determine how the Prosecutor links the suspect to the state/collective act.
The drafters of the London Charter of 1945 wrestled with, and finally
incorporated, the idea of organizational guilt, whereby organizations themselves would be prosecuted and individuals who had joined voluntarily could
be punished on the basis of membership alone.197 But the Nuremberg
judges ultimately curbed the Allied Prosecutors’ theory of collective responsibility and held that membership alone was not sufficient—to be found
guilty, the defendant must have known that the organization was engaged in
the crime.198
Taking a more sophisticated approach, the ICTY and ICTR recognize two
forms of individual criminal responsibility linking an individual to the

196. David Cohen, Beyond Nuremberg: Individual Responsibility for War Crimes, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
POLITICAL TRANSITIONS: GETTYSBURG TO BOSNIA 53 (Carla Hesse & Robert Post eds., 1999).
197. London Charter, supra note 14, arts. 9, 10.
198. Even in 1945, the doctrine was highly problematic. According to Telford Taylor, “The conspiracy case . . . bid fair to swallow the greater part of the entire case.” TAYLOR, supra note 14, at 80. In the
end, “[t]he practical and moral difficulties proved overwhelming” and the judges rejected much of the
conspiracy case, except, notably, in relation to crimes against peace. Id. at 75.
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state/collective act—superior responsibility199 and participation in a joint
criminal enterprise (“enterprise participation”).200 The emphasis of superior
responsibility, points out Professor Mark Osiel, is on the chain of command,
while enterprise participation is more “consonant with the differing dimensions of mass atrocity, where malevolent influence travels through informal
and widely dispersed networks.”201 In order to prove superior responsibility,
the Prosecutor must demonstrate that the superior possessed the requisite
mens rea (the superior “knew or had reason to know”) that a superiorsubordinate relationship existed and that the superior failed to prevent or
punish the subordinates’ wrongs.202 Enterprise participation, on the other
hand, requires the Prosecutor to show “a common plan, design or purpose
which amounts to . . . the commission of a crime provided for in the Statute.”203 The three forms of enterprise participation are a shared intent to
bring about a certain offense,204 organized systems of repression and illtreatment,205 and criminal acts beyond the common design but which are “a
natural and foreseeable consequence” of the actions taken.”206
The ICC includes both superior responsibility207 and enterprise participation.208 From the perspective of an international Prosecutor, however, both
are troublesome. The two modes of individual responsibility have been refined somewhat based on the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, but the
refinements do not resolve the essential prosecutorial dilemma identified by
Osiel and others209—superior responsibility is narrow and difficult to prove,
while enterprise participation is broad but “dangerously illiberal.”210
For the ICC Prosecutor, the strategic advantages of enterprise participation over superior responsibility are overwhelming. Enterprise participation
has the potential to capture individuals joined in informal networks, civilian
participants outside the chain of command (e.g., former Bosnian Serb leader
Radovan Karadzic), members of independently operating paramilitaries or
cells, private military contractors, industrialists, the broker between organizations (e.g., Željko Ražnatović, leader of the notorious Serb paramilitary
199. ICTY Statute, supra note 54, art. 7(3); ICTR Statute, supra note 54, art. 6(3).
200. ICTY Statute, supra note 54, art. 7(1); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶¶
185–229 (July 15, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/tad-aj990715e.pdf
[hereinafter Tadic]; ICTR Statute, supra note 54, art. 6(1); Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR96-19-A, Judgment, ¶ 468 (Dec. 13, 2004). The ICTR Statute eliminates much of the need for joint
criminal enterprise by including conspiracy to commit genocide.
201. Osiel, supra note 194, at 1770.
202. ICTY Statute, supra note 54, art. 7(3).
203. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 772 (Jan. 14, 2000), available
at http://www.un.org/icty/kupreskic/appeal/judgement/kup-tj000114e.pdf.
204. Tadic, supra note 200, ¶ 196.
205. Id. ¶ 202.
206. Id. ¶ 204.
207. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 28.
208. Id. art. 25(3)(d).
209. Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75 (2005).
210. Osiel, supra note 194, at 1772.
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group known as Arkan’s Tigers), and many others beyond the reach of the
superior responsibility doctrine.211 But, as the Nuremberg experience and
the jurisprudence of the ICTY have demonstrated,212 the legitimacy of the
doctrine of enterprise participation is under siege. Since there is no telling
when a skeptical panel of international judges will rein it in, the doctrine of
enterprise participation is an insecure basis upon which to present valuable
evidence acquired at considerable risk to ICC investigators and witnesses.
One way the Working Group can manage the problem and facilitate the
Prosecutor’s task is by selecting the differentiated approach, which includes
a provision on enterprise participation (article 25(3)(d)), while also including
a leadership qualifier that limits responsibility to top-tier individuals with
the requisite mens rea who lead, direct, organize and/or direct, or engage in
the planning, preparation, initiation, or execution of an act of aggression/
armed attack.213 However, including a leadership qualifier in the definition
of the crime effectively eliminates the possibility of a case based on superior
responsibility: if aggression is a leadership crime, superior responsibility,
whereby superiors are held responsible for the criminal acts of their subordinates, becomes unintelligible.214 While eliminating one avenue for linking
the individual to the vast bureaucratic apparatus of the state, the leadership
qualifier and mens rea requirement would, to a large extent, transform this
“dangerously illiberal” and, for the ICC Prosecutor, highly unpredictable
doctrine into something more liberal and reliable.
4. Arresting Suspects
According to Professor Gary Bass, “the single biggest challenge for international war crimes tribunals has been the unwillingness of even liberal
states to endanger their own soldiers either by arresting war criminals or in
subsequent reprisals.”215 Bass argues that “[o]ne of the most important—
and crude—reasons for the triumph of Nuremberg was that it did not require any additional risks for Allied soldiers, since the Allies had demanded
an unconditional Axis surrender before settling on a war crimes policy.”216
An outstanding feature of the NATO arrest raids to capture indicted ICTY
suspects “has been their trepidation about taking risks. Unpopular and marginal war crimes suspects may get nabbed, but not a well-defended and
popular figure like Mladic.”217
211. Id. at 1786.
212. Id. at 1764 (referring to Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 54–57 (July
29, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/blaskic/appeal/judgement/bla- aj040729e.pdf, and Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 237–239 (Apr. 19, 2004), available at http://www.
un.org/icty/krstic/Appeal/judgement/krs-aj040419e.pdf).
213. Chairman’s 2007 Discussion Paper, supra note 84, art. 1.
214. Under this proposal, article 28 of the Rome Statute, supra note 2, on “Responsibility of commanders and other superiors,” would need to be modified or excluded.
215. BASS, supra note 14, at 277.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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The ICC Prosecutor has neither a mandate nor resources to arrest suspects.
However, in a 2006 policy paper, Moreno-Ocampo recognized galvanizing
arrest as one of the key objectives the ICC Prosecutors should pursue:
[T]he experience gained so far demonstrates that the Office can and
should deploy substantial efforts to gathering information on the
whereabouts of suspects, galvanizing support and cooperation for arrest
and surrender, and promoting coordination among national and international parties potentially involved in a successful arrest.218
And yet, the victorious aggressors in armed conflicts will often be welldefended, and sometimes popular, making it exceptionally difficult for the
Prosecutor to galvanize the necessary cooperation. The first three years of
ICC activity confirm Bass’s insight that states are fearful of placing their
soldiers at risk for the sake of international justice. It has proven extremely
challenging for the Prosecutor to generate state cooperation to arrest even
politically and militarily compromised suspects for the most reprehensible
crimes. In a 2006 op-ed, Moreno-Ocampo made an earnest appeal to arrest
the indicted leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army, asserting that “to do
justice and re-establish security in the region, the justice network has to
arrest the LRA commanders.”219 At the time of writing, in spite of MorenoOcampo’s repeated petitions to the Security Council, ICC member states,
international police networks, transnational business leaders, nongovernmental organizations, local communities, and the media, the indicted LRA
leaders are still at-large.
Hermann Göring once predicted that “[t]he victor will always be the
judge, and the vanquished the accused.”220 Not a single recorded historical
example exists of a victorious leader being arrested for his behavior during
wartime. Unless the ICC Prosecutor manages to galvanize states to arrest
victorious perpetrators of the crime of aggression—highly unlikely due to
the states’ reticence to even arrest compromised leaders for uncontroversial
crimes to date—the law will be applied unequally, compromising its legitimacy. Clever defendants like Slobodan Milošević and Saddam Hussein will
continue to capitalize on the apparent injustice, turn the tables on the victors, and put the tribunal itself on trial to advance their political agenda.
Members of the SWGCA, recognizing that it will be particularly difficult
for the Prosecutor to galvanize cooperation to arrest aggression suspects,
have sought to facilitate the task by proposing jurisdictional triggers that
engender consensus and/or prevent a case from proceeding absent the requisite support. The assumption is that if the Security Council, the General
Assembly, or the International Court of Justice triggers an aggression case,
218. OTP Selection Criteria, supra note 188, at 8.
219. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, A Global Web of Justice Is Up and Running, INT’L HERALD TRIB., June 12,
2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/06/11/opinion/edocampo.php.
220. G.M. GILBERT, NUREMBERG DIARY 4 (1947).
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ICC states parties will be more motivated to cooperate with the court and
enforce its arrest warrants. This empirical assumption cannot be evaluated
without implementing the provision and monitoring cooperation. But if the
will of a duly empowered U.N. body to trigger a case in fact correlates with
the will of member states to commit resources and arrest indicted persons,
the best body to involve, from the perspective of the Prosecutor, would be
the Security Council because of its capacity to authorize the use of force in
carrying out arrests.
5. Establishing the Legitimacy of the Crime Itself
The Nuremberg judgment is a warning to an ICC Prosecutor building a
case against the perpetrators of the crime of aggression—he or she must be
prepared to defend the legitimacy, and possibly the legality, of the crime
itself. At the International Military Tribunal (“IMT”) at Nuremberg, the
defendants raised three challenges to the legitimacy of the aggression provisions that were never conclusively resolved in the judgment.221 They
claimed that (1) the crime against peace, as the crime of aggression was
known in 1945, was illegitimate because it was not prohibited at the time
the defendants acted; (2) the accusers had committed the same crime and
were not prosecuted; and (3) the tribunal itself was illegitimate because it
was dispensing victor’s justice and was biased. Even today, these attacks on
the legitimacy of the crime of aggression resonate among scholars studying
the Nuremberg judgment.222
The first challenge to the legitimacy of the crime at Nuremberg, nullum
crimen sine lege, or “no crime without law,” is a formulation of the principle
of legality that excludes criminal sanctions for acts that were not prohibited
at the time of their commission.223 The Nazi defendants at Nuremberg argued that the charges of crimes against peace violated the principle because,
prior to the London Charter, there was no criminal prohibition on war—
sovereigns held a droit de guerre, or right of war—and, in any event, they
were immune from prosecution for crimes committed while in office under
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Rejecting these contentions, the tribunal found that the prosecution’s argument that the crime predated the act
was justified, based on a number of treaties of non-aggression signed by
German statesmen prior to World War II.224 The tribunal also rejected the
221. London Charter, supra note 14, art. 6.
222. Developments in the Law: International Criminal Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 1982 (2001);
Steven Fogelson, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled Promise, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 833, 858–61 (1990);
Jeremy Peterson, Unpacking Show Trials: Situating the Trial of Saddam Hussein, 48 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 258,
275 (2006).
223. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 15(1), opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (“No one shall be held guilty of any criminal
offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or
international law, at the time when it was committed.”).
224. “Occupying the positions they did in the Government of Germany, the defendants or at least
some of them must have known of the treaties signed by Germany, outlawing recourse to war for the
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defense assertion that “where the act in question is an act of State, those who
carry it out are not personally responsible, but are protected by the doctrine
of the sovereignty of the State,” holding that international law applies to
individuals as well as states.225
Although the Nuremberg judgment is taken as a watershed and a key
precedent in international criminal law, many scholars today question the
veracity of the second holding, considering it lex ferenda rather than lex lata.
The school of thought that questions the legitimacy of this aspect of the
IMT judgment is still present and any defense lawyer would be remiss not
to make both arguments—act of state and sovereign immunity—on his or
her client’s behalf. Thus, the Prosecutor should expect a nullum crimen sine
lege challenge under article 22 and be prepared with a response.226 Besides
the Nuremberg judgment establishing aggression as a crime in international
law, the fact that aggression is a crime in the Rome Statute is a strong,
though not necessarily decisive, argument for the enforcement of the
prohibition.
The ICC Prosecutor can also expect the defense to raise the tu coque challenge on behalf of his or her client. The tu coque argument holds that because
the accusers have committed the same crime as the accused without being
punished, it is therefore unjust to punish the defendant. One of the most
damaging legacies of Nuremberg was that nations providing judges were
sometimes led by statesmen and soldiers who had committed similar crimes
as the accused. German defendants were convicted of conspiracy to wage
aggressive war against Poland, but there was no mention of the 1939 HitlerStalin Pact according to which Poland was to be partitioned.227 However,
the Allied judges ultimately rejected the Nazi leaders’ tu coque argument
accusing the Allies of the crime of aggression and found the defendants
guilty.
Though the tu coque defense has never won an international criminal law
case, it has been raised on several occasions, including during the trials of
Slobodan Milošević and Saddam Hussein. The tu coque defense undermines
the overall legitimacy of the tribunal and potentially its effectiveness when
well-formulated and supported by compelling evidence. The strongest
counter-argument that the ICC Prosecutor has at his or her disposal is that
settlement of international disputes, they must have known that they were acting in defiance of all
international law when in complete deliberation they carried out their designs of invasion and aggression.
On this view of the case alone, it would appear that the maxim [nullum crimen sine lege] has no application
to the present facts.” Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 11, at 217.
225. Id. at 220.
226. A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question
constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. 2. The definition
of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the
definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 22.
227. See BASS, supra note 14, at 200.
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the tu coque defense is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of a particular
accused for the crimes listed in the indictment.
The Prosecutor can protect the legitimacy of the ICC from such accusations at the outset by investigating and prosecuting powerful and well-connected suspects as well as vanquished aggressors. However, by accumulating
a list of indicted individuals accused of the crime of aggression whom no
state is willing to arrest, the Prosecutor risks the legitimacy of the ICC in a
different way. In this sense, the Prosecutor’s duties of impartiality and effectiveness are likely to come into conflict when prosecuting the crime of aggression. It will be his or her challenge to strike the balance that best
safeguards the legitimacy of the ICC amidst accusations of bias on the one
hand and impotence on the other.
Beyond the three historic challenges raised at Nuremberg, subsequent
working groups on the crime of aggression have unearthed additional doubts
about the legitimacy and legality of the crime. In particular, depending
upon the way the crime is defined, it may violate the presumption of innocence or be void for vagueness and, on one of these bases, be altered,
marginalized, or struck down by the ICC judges.
Article 66 of the Rome Statute guarantees that the accused shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty and that the onus is on the Prosecutor
to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.228 Under the
Rome Statute, the presumption of innocence applies to every aspect of the
charges, and the burden of proof cannot be shifted to the accused at any
point.229 Nevertheless, the Working Group is considering empowering an
outside body to make a determination that an act of aggression has occurred
as a jurisdictional precondition and/or as an element of the crime.230 Models
representing the greatest threat to the presumption of innocence also make
the outside determination prejudicial (i.e. non-reviewable) by the Court. Incorporating an element of the crime that the accused must refute, or worse,
that is non-refutable, violates the presumption of innocence and makes the
crime of aggression, and any case the Prosecutor bases upon it, vulnerable to
defeat by the bench.231
Another basis for challenging the legitimacy and legality of the crime is
its definitional vagueness. A crime that is defined too vaguely violates the
rights of the accused because he or she had no basis to distinguish permissible from impermissible behavior. There are several aspects of the crime of
aggression that might render it void for vagueness. The first is the state/
collective act of aggression itself. According to the U.N. Charter, the deter228. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 66.
229. See id. art. 67(1)(i).
230. See supra Part II.C.
231. The worst violation of the presumption of innocence makes the prejudicial outside determination that an act of aggression has occurred an element of the crime. It is a gray area whether an outside
determination for the purpose of jurisdiction violates the presumption so badly as to violate the principle
of legality.
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mination that an act of aggression has occurred is a political rather than a
legal judgment made primarily by the Security Council. The lack of a legal
definition of the state/collective act makes the crime as vague as can be. In
addition, the Working Group seems prepared to incorporate G.A. Resolution 3314, the 1974 definition of aggression, into the crime, in whole or in
part.232 But this definition was designed to assess aggression by states, and
some authorities, most notably the International Law Commission in its
1996 Draft Code, do not consider it to be precise enough to serve as the
basis for a criminal trial for the crime of aggression.233
Another aspect of the proposed crime of aggression that renders all of the
models vague is the incorporation of “dangerously illiberal” modes of individual criminal liability—enterprise participation in particular—which to
date has no predictable built-in or jurisprudential limitations.234 Discussing
the vagueness problem in relation to the doctrine of enterprise participation
at the ICTY, Osiel observes that “defense counsel receives no fair notice of
the case she must refute, for it is not really until closing argument that she
can have any clear idea of the target at which she must aim.”235 For the
Prosecutor to be able to rely on the crime of aggression when constructing
his or her case, the crime itself must be precise enough to withstand judicial
scrutiny.
IV. CONCLUSION
It would be optimistic to wait expectantly for the ICC’s Assembly of
States Parties to incontrovertibly resolve the question of individual responsibility for aggressive war in 2010. The history of twentieth century attempts
to define the supreme international crime is a history of failure, punctuated
by rare glimpses of success. These glimpses include the signing of the idealistic but ill-fated interwar assurances, the 1945 Nuremberg watershed and
its successor trials, the General Assembly’s 1974 consensus definition of aggression, the creation of the U.N. ad hoc tribunals, the drafting of the Rome
Statute with its provision on aggression, and the emergence of a functioning
International Criminal Court. Gradually, precedents, institutions, doctrine,
and procedures have amassed, and with periodic ICC review conferences
scheduled, the machinery is in place to define and implement the crime, if
not in 2010, then at a subsequent opportunity.
From the perspective of the ICC Prosecutor, it is important that the
Working Group produce a draft provision that maximizes his or her effectiveness while insulating him or her from accusations of political bias. This
tension recurs throughout many of the drafting proposals. The foremost,
232.
233.
234.
235.

See
See
See
Id.

supra Part II.A.
ILC Work Report, supra note 56.
Osiel, supra note 194, at 1772.
at 1803.
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though not exclusive, factor in mitigating the tension is the jurisdictional
trigger and, in particular, the statutory relationship between the Prosecutor
and the organ making the determination whether a state/collective act of
aggression has or has not occurred, be it the Security Council, the General
Assembly, the International Court of Justice, or an expanded Pre-Trial
Chamber. However the determination is made, it is clear that unless the
determination is made reviewable by the ICC as an element of the crime, the
provision will be compromised and the Prosecutor’s case will become
unstable.
Foreseeing prosecutorial challenges common to all formulations is one
way to imagine how an aggression case will look. The challenges in prompting the referral, selecting the case, linking the suspect to the state act, arresting suspects, and establishing the legitimacy of the crime itself will be
key struggles likely to occupy much of the Prosecutor’s attention. These
struggles will play out in the Prosecutor’s office, diplomatic meetings,
courts, and the media.
The criminalization of aggression is a worthwhile endeavor if it reduces
human suffering and mitigates harm. Proponents hope that a widely accepted minimum standard will function as a focal point to help coordinate
actions—domestic, international, transnational—that will deter or prevent
leaders from resorting to state/collective violence. But there are a number of
risks. The standard may deter the wrong sort of violent actions, actions that
reduce human suffering such as the unauthorized use of force to prevent
genocide. A related risk inherent in any prohibition is the implicit permission contained within. If the threshold is set too high, the crime of aggression may in fact legitimize objectionable acts of violence by not capturing
them. Furthermore, mandating the ICC to prosecute aggression may undermine its effectiveness in domains of other crimes within its jurisdiction.
Another key consideration for states evaluating the crime is the legitimacy of the system established by the Rome Statute. As states evaluate the
drafts in the run-up to 2009 or 2010, they should remind themselves that it
was the prohibition on the use of force and its repeated violation—with no
recourse—that undid the League of Nations. Finally, it is far from clear
whether an operational crime of aggression will bolster or undermine diplomatic avenues for world peace. Against the backdrop of all the concerns
surrounding the crime of aggression, the value of the crime will ultimately
be judged by its capacity, in the hands of an able Prosecutor, to galvanize
cooperation and compel compliance.

